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“[H]ouses make a town, but citizens make a city.”1
“As orderly and efficient as U.S. property law sometimes is, this
very same orderliness mutes and distorts underlying struggles of
property use and value.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay is the first fruit of a project arising from observa-
tions made during a week-long study trip to Rio de Janeiro in
July, 2010.3  It considers in a preliminary way some cultural
resonances of a program of regularizing title (regularização) to
dwellings in Rio’s favelas,4 comparing them to recent and ongoing
understandings of the cultural significance of homeownership and
homelessness in United States property jurisprudence. Given the
space limits here, the Essay focuses mostly on an exposition of
some generally shared United States approaches to homeowner-
ship and homelessness in comparison to a very pared-down ver-
sion of (somewhat) analogous Brazilian concepts and concerns.  A
truly detailed exploration of regularização in Rio,5 the right to
1. Edésio Fernandes, The Social Function of Urban Property in Brazil; Nature,
Developments, and Constraints of the New Urban Land Governance Framework in
Brazil 16 (May, 2011) (paper presented at the Fordham Law School Conference on the
Social Function of Property) (on file with author).
2. Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Community and Property in Brazil
and the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 448 (2006).
3. This study week, attended by professors and graduate students from several
disciplines and several countries, was part of a series of study weeks called “Study
Space”, produced by Professor Colin Crawford, until recently of Georgia State
University College of Law and now of Tulane University Law School.  The Rio de
Janeiro 2010 Study Space was co-organized by Professors Romulo Sampaio and Maria
Clara Dias.  The participants attended lectures and participated in activities
concerning the subjects of land use, the environment, and issues of wealth and
poverty in Rio.
4. Favela is Portuguese for shantytown. Colin Crawford, The Social Function of
Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1105 (2011).
5. In making my comparison, I focus on formalization of title.  Edésio Fernandes
explains that regularization may in fact encompass several types of legal rights.  “The
definition of the nature of the rights to be attributed to dwellers has varied greatly,
ranging from titles (such as freehold and leasehold) to contracts (such as social rent
and other rental mechanisms) and precarious administrative permits (such as
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housing or moradia,6 the “right to the city”,7 and the “social func-
tion of property” as applied in Brazil,8 and of cidadania9 generally,
temporary licenses and certificates of occupancy).” Edésio Fernandes, The Influence of
de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, LAND LINES (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy),
January, 2002, at 5; see EDÉSIO FERNANDES, REGULARIZATION OF INFORMAL
SETTLEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 38-39 (Lincoln Inst. Land Pol’y 2011) (cataloguing
several different types of titles or enforceable rights that can provide security of
tenure).  Moreover, Fernandes identifies two basic, intertwined goals of
regularization programs: “to recognize security of tenure and to promote the
sociospatial integration of informal communities within the broader urban structures
and society.”  Fernandes [2002], supra, at 5. Some Latin American countries have
focused solely on formalization of title, while Brazil has sought to provide legal
security of tenure within a set of integrated social and legal interventions.
FERNANDES [2011], supra, at 26-27.
6. This right is typically expressed in English as a “right to housing” or “right to
shelter.”  It is expressed in Portuguese by a right to moradia.  The root word morar
means to dwell someplace. Colin Crawford criticizes the standard English translation
of moradia.  “[T]he translation of ‘moradia’ as ‘housing’ is a highly imperfect one
because in Portuguese the word connotes more than mere habitation but also the
basket of social services, for example, roads, utilities, access to recreation and other
services, that typically accompany planned communities.”  Crawford, supra note 4, at
1102.  Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political
Rights provides for a right to adequate housing.  International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-19
(1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Economic Covenant].  An important interpretation
of this right may be found at General Comment 4 of the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social, and Political Rights.  United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social, and Political Rights, General Comment 4, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (12/13/1991),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/469f4d91a9378221c1
2563ed0053547e?Opendocument.
7. The term was coined by French philosopher Henri Lefebvre. HENRI LEFEBVRE,
LE DROIT À LA VILLE (1968); see also HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION
(Robert Bononno trans., U. Minn. Press 2003).  It is quite nebulous. As one true
adherent to Lefebvre observes, “the density of Lefebvre’s style can at times obscure
his message.”  Chris Butler, Critical Legal Studies and the Politics of Space, 18 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 313, 327 (2009).  Ngai Pindell provides a helpful introduction to the
Brazilian law, history, and practice on the right to the city. Pindell, supra note 2, at
440-59.  Whatever the term means, Brazil takes the right to the city seriously. See
Edésio Fernandes, Constructing the “Right to the City” in Brazil, 16 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 201, 202 (2007).
8. The social function of property is also part of Brazilian law and practice,
though perhaps more problematically. See generally Alexandre dos Santos Cunha,
The Social Function of Property in Brazilian Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171 (2011).
Sometimes a “social function of the city” is identified and discussed separately from
the “social function of property”. See, e.g., Pindell, supra note 2, at 437. Pindell writes
that the social function of the city is “not . . . succinctly summarized” and “[i]n part
provides a context for the exercise of the social function of property.” Id. This sounds
accurate to me, and I am not treating the social function of city at length separately
from the social function of property here.  The concepts overlap at a cultural level.
9. Cidadania is the Portuguese word for citizenship. I find significant the
Portuguese focus on citizenship deriving from the city (Portuguese cidade) as opposed
to the English focus on citizenship applying to the individual citizen (though to be
sure citizen in English is also derived from “city”).
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will have to await further research.  Some of these concepts are
explored briefly in Section II.B.10
In a broad sense, what United States property theory and
popular culture typically lack is the sociolegal context that Brazil-
ian jurisprudence and custom supply.  My initial observation at
the end of my study week in Rio11 was that the desire of the favela-
dweller to obtain regularized title has a very different inflection
than the longstanding focus in the United States on the impor-
tance of achieving homeownership.  In the United States, home-
ownership signifies achieving both a certain status and a certain
economic security, on an individual and family basis.12  Homeown-
ership, long part of “the American Dream,”13 does not expressly
focus on the raft of interconnected services and interpersonal rela-
tions that may come with security of tenure.  Nor does it typically
focus immediately on the way in which dwelling as a homeowner
encourages a different relationship to land, community, and local
government.14  Security and community also seem to be behind
Rio’s titling program.15  During the Study Space discussions, how-
ever, the concerns were expressed more in terms of reliable stabil-
ity of connection, availability of services, and citizenship.
Regularizing title did not seem to me to have a principal signifi-
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. See the conversations described infra Section II.A.
12. See infra Section III. Americans from historically oppressed groups, such as
African-Americans and Latino-Americans, will likely understand their personal
success in achieving homeownership against a backdrop of race relations, and may
therefore have a different appreciation of the way in which their individual efforts
and achievements are shaped by larger group and class dynamics.
13. See, JIM CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA THAT
SHAPED A NATION 134-57 (2003) (chapter addressing the dream of owning a detached
house). I use the term “United States” here, rather than “America” and “American”,
whenever possible, as there are two continents of “American” countries.  However,
sometimes an idiomatic phrase or quotation such as “the American Dream” has to be
invoked.
14. There is certainly a cogent argument within United States jurisprudence that
homeowners behave differently than renters because of their long-term commitment
to dwelling on property in a particular place, and that that commitment shapes their
interaction with the community. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001).  This analysis, inflected through a lens of
individual behavior, self-interest, and public choice mechanisms at the level of local
government, is not so much about what homeownership means as about what it
incentivizes.  Fischel provides an economic account of how homeownership affects the
construction of community. But cf. Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen
Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (2011) (critiquing and reassessing
the notion of citizenship effects of homeownership).
15. See infra Section II.
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cance of an individual’s achieving a certain status or gaining
access to a wealth-preserving mechanism.16
Some of the concerns that seem to be expressed in this partic-
ular Brazilian cultural understanding of providing regularized
formal title to the dwelling appear more clearly in United States
discussions of homelessness.17  These include, for example, achiev-
ing overnight shelter, privacy, protection by police, and access to
basic social services.  However, much of the United States dis-
course on homelessness is attuned to questions of individual
responsibility for homelessness and to compassionate social and
legal responses to homelessness on an individual basis.  Alterna-
tively, the homelessness discourse questions the responsibility of
specific institutions, such as hospitals and prisons, recommending
policy changes to redirect institutional behavior.  The dimension
of interconnection, both in terms of actual services and of psycho-
logical citizenship, is not as often expressed or considered.18
One contribution of this Essay will be to identify Jane Baron’s
critique of United States discourse around homelessness19 and
suggest that it could also apply, in reverse, to homeownership and
informal security of tenure.  Baron argues that United States
homelessness discourse lacks a consideration of the role of prop-
erty and its connecting, socializing, and citizenship functions.20
Baron argues that we need to understand the homeless as having
the opposite of property, as having “no property.”21  She is correct.
Baron could go further, though.  To my mind, the issue is not “no
property” as such, but having no place to dwell, to take root.
Security of home/housing/shelter facilitates the web of relation-
ships and obligations that Baron correctly identifies as a conse-
quence of “property.”
In the penultimate Section of this essay, I advance five possi-
ble explanations for the different resonances of homeownership
16. The interpretation of regularization that conforms to Hernando de Soto’s
theory of freeing up informal wealth by formalizing ownership is not discussed in any
detail in this Essay. See infra the brief discussion at the end of Section I.
17. See infra Section IV.
18. To be sure, claims of constitutional citizenship are mobilized, for example in
order to argue that the homeless are constitutionally protected from criminalization.
But homelessness is not thereby conceived of as deserving citizenship in the sense of
cidadania, full participation in community.
19. See Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property Problem, 36 URB. LAW. 273
(2004).
20. Id. at 286-87.
21. Id.
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discourse in the United States and Brazil.22  One factor is surely
the two countries’ different histories around the distribution of
public land, and thus, of concentration of land ownership.23  A sec-
ond is different legal traditions around the basic account of prop-
erty, with contemporary Brazilian discourse relying heavily on a
certain conception of the social function of property.24
Third, the process of regularization of title in Brazil is colored
by the incontrovertible presence of immense populations of visible
squatter communities.25 Thus, in Brazil regularization of title
becomes part of the discourse as to where millions of people have a
right to dwell, if anywhere.  As things stand, the inhabitants of
informal communities are neither homeless nor altogether secure.
In contrast, squatter communities in the United States are per-
haps less evident.26  Perhaps for this reason too, United States dis-
course often proceeds on a level that fails to engage the political
dimensions of homelessness on the one hand, and of homeowner-
ship on the other; and it may also be especially thin on race and
22. See infra Section V.
23. See infra Section V.A.
24. See infra Section V.B.
25. See infra Section V.C.
26. Jane Larson argues that the presence of large irregular populations in
colonias, principally in Texas, provides the primary example of squatter communities
at a large scale in the United States; and further that these communities are
understudied. See Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 137, 140-41 (2002).  It is certainly true that colonias have not become a
central feature of the shared United States understanding of homelessness or
homeownership.  Tent cities are another type of informal community whose presence
and visibility in the United States waxes and wanes with the economy. See, Zoe
Loftus-Farren, Comment, Tent Cities: An Interim Solution to Homelessness and
Affordable Housing Shortages in the United States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1037 (2011).
These too are understudied. Id. at 1057.
Michelle Wilde Anderson makes a persuasive case that poor communities living
in unincorporated areas in the urban fringe, typically Black or Latino (and including
colonias as one type), are similarly misunderstood and understudied. See, e.g.,
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931
(2010); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at
the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2008). Many of her recommendations for
addressing the hardships of these communities systematically, once they are
understood systematically, involve community empowerment through reform of
county government—not an argument about formal title, to be sure, but surely one
about effectively belonging to a political community.  Also, Anderson’s underlying
concerns around living conditions in the poor urban fringe and her desire to enhance
human flourishing have much in common with concerns about informal communities,
and her solutions in a way propose a kind of enhanced localism. See discussion of
localism as an underlying issue in understanding informal settlements, infra Sections
V.E and VI.
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class analysis.27  United States property discourse sometimes
obscures underlying urgent systemic political dimensions of prop-
erty in land and the home.
Another potential source of the difference is that United
States jurisprudence typically rejects broad aspirational princi-
ples such as a right to housing as “law.”28  This may be especially
true as to principles generated from foreign and international
sources.  “Progressive realization” of broad aspirational principles,
a common understanding applied to some of the more far-reaching
assertions of international human rights law, may also be outside
the mainstream of United States concepts of law.29
In the Section V.E, I observe that suspicions about broad aspi-
rations as law combine with a characteristic reluctance in main-
stream United States property jurisprudence to see property as
processual, rather than fixed by stable principles.30  The dominant
approach to law is abstract, universal, and monist. Consequently,
United States property jurisprudence may obscure or seriously
discount the vague, always-in-flux qualities of both broad aspira-
tions for housing for the poor and pragmatic informal property
arrangements that sometimes achieve these goals outside a
strictly legal framework.
The Essay concludes with a few suggestions for some next
27. This is an overgeneralization, of course, and some scholars within the legal
academy do link issues of right to housing and homeownership to race and class. See,
e.g., Carol Necole Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 907 (2010) (describing a theory of the racial discrimination against African
Americans present in the dual mortgage market for home financing); Dorothy A.
Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329 (2009) (analyzing
disparities in Black and White homeownership in terms of race and class, and
proposing tax code reforms to address the disparity); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting
the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 29 (2007) (presenting a case study of predatory lending to low-income
households in the United States as a way of testing Hernando de Soto’s hypothesis
about the advantages of propertization of informal property); Audrey G. McFarlane,
The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and Property
Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855 (comparing generalized assertions about the benefits of
homeownership to the actual experiences of Blacks and Latinos, discerning
systematic differences, and asserting the need for a “right to keep”); Elizabeth
Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle is Not Enough, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1787-98 (2004) (describing racial differences in
homeownership, bankruptcy of owners as opposed to renters, and disparate effects of
predatory lending by race).
28. See infra Section V.D.
29. Larson 2002, supra note 26, at 144 (“Progressive realization is not an easy idea
to incorporate into our legal tradition.”).
30. See infra Section V.E.
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steps.31 These include pursuit of further specific investigations of
informal communities in both the United States and the develop-
ing world; reflections on the role of the local (not so much the spe-
cifically informal or private, but the local) in making informal
settlements work at all; and problematizing unduly universal,
individualistic, classical liberal property theory.  Abstract prop-
erty discourse, by masking the local, may in itself have a political
function and foster injustice.  It may treat land as just another
commodity, appropriately subject to one set of rules, rather than
as involving particularized arrangements about dwelling in local
contexts that implicate class and often race.
One important approach to regularizing title is given short
shrift in this Essay.  Hernando de Soto famously proposed that
great wealth resided in informal poor communities in cities
around the world, and that it could be unleashed to create more
wealth through a formalization of title that would enable that
wealth to function as capital.32  Whether de Soto’s argument is cor-
rect is subject to much ongoing discussion; at best it seems to be a
sufficient condition for economic improvement of the welfare of the
poor only under certain conditions.33  Whatever the merits of de
31. See infra Section VI.
32. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE
OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1989).
33. “Far from being a panacea, regularization and titling programs possess
advantages and disadvantages which must be evaluated on a case by case basis.”
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Squatters, Pirates, and Entrepreneurs: Is Informal Housing the
Solution to the Urban Housing Crisis?, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 239, 251
(2009). Michael Trebilcock and various co-authors reach similar conclusions about the
contingency of the benefits of formalizing property rights in land. See Jamie Baxter &
Michael Trebilcock, “Formalizing” Land Tenure in First Nations: Evaluating the Case
for Reserve Tenure Reform, 7 INDIGENOUS L.J. 45 (2009); Michael Trebilcock & Paul-
Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization,
30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2008).  Alan Gilbert quips that the policy is popular with the
right because “Legalized self-help housing permits people to become proper citizens;
they can borrow money against their homes . . . . Ironically, you are not recognized as
a full citizen in modern society until you have been in debt and have a credit rating.”
Alan Gilbert, Love in the Time of Enhanced Capital Flows: Reflections on the Links
between Liberalization and Informality, in URBAN INFORMALITY: TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTH ASIA 13, 57
(Ananya Roy & Nezar Alsayyad eds., 2004); see also Ray Bromley, Poverty & Power:
Why de Soto’s “Mystery of Capital” Cannot Be Solved, in URBAN INFORMALITY:
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTH
ASIA 271 (Ananya Roy & Nezar Alsayyad eds., 2004) (critiquing de Soto); Dyal-Chand,
supra note 27 (evaluating de Soto’s hypothesis by reference to homeownership among
poor and minority cohorts in the United States; they have access to the property
rights de Soto recommends for the Global South, but remain poor); Edésio Fernandes,
An Evaluation of Hernando de Soto’s Agenda, lecture at the Lincoln Institute of Land
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Soto’s arguments and whatever their influence on Brazilian regu-
larization of title programs, they are tangential to the focus of this
essay on cultural constructions of formal ownership of the home
and their reflection in the differing jurisprudences of Brazil and
the United States.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE INQUIRY
A. One Fine Day in Rio de Janeiro
In one morning study session during our Study Space week,
the topic was regularização, the regularization of title in Rio’s
favelas. These settlements, many on public land in Rio, have been
in existence for generations, and house more than a million of
Rio’s poor and many millions more throughout Brazil.34 Favela
Policy, March 25, 2009, available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/video/ee0da042
0c214e44a9ce95de677bd539/An-Evaluation-of-Hernando-de-Soto-s-Agenda
(comprehensive and accessible critique of de Soto’s theory) (hereinafter “Fernandes
lecture”); Fernandes [2002], supra note 5, at 8 (de Soto is correct to question the
legitimacy of exclusionary legal systems, but misunderstands the economic processes
of ownership as well as to some extent the legal processes); Alan Gilbert, On the
Mystery of Capital and the Myths of Hernando de Soto: What Difference Does Legal
Title Make?, 24 INT’L DEV. PLAN. REV. 1 (2002); HERNANDO DE SOTO AND PROPERTY IN
A MARKET ECONOMY (D. Benjamin Barros ed., 2010) (offering a variety of authors’
assessments of De Soto’s arguments); Tayyab Mahmud, “Surplus Humanity” and the
Margins of Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and Accumulation by Dispossession, 14 CHAP.
L. REV. 1, 60 - 65 (2010) (critiquing de Soto and other titling responses to the plight of
urban slum-dwellers); Timothy Mitchell, The Work of Economics: How a Discipline
Makes Its World,  46 ARCHIVES EUROPÉENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 297 (2005) (critiquing de
Soto’s thesis and the neoliberal intellectual and political matrix in which it emerged
and has been tested); Jean-Louis van Gelder, Legal Tenure Security, Perceived Tenure
Security and Housing Improvement in Buenos Aires: An Attempt towards Integration,
33 INT’L J. URB. & REG. RES. 126, 142 (2009) (“scholars have drawn attention to the
face that legalization can diminish rather than increase the tenure security or certain
groups of dwellers”); Ann Varley, Private or Public: Debating the Meaning of Tenure
Legalization, 26 INT’L J. URB. & REG. RES. 449 (2002); Peter M. Ward, Flavio de
Souza, Cecilia Giusti, & Jane E. Larson, El Tı́tulo en la Mano: The Impact of Titling
Programs on Low-Income Housing in Texas Colonias, 36 LAW & SOC. INQ. 1 (2011)
(questioning de Soto’s thesis in light of the impact of formal titling on low-income
housing in Texas colonias).
Disagreement among scholars and policymakers over whether regularization of
title will assist those living in so-called informal housing arrangements or rather
destabilize their security of tenure predates de Soto’s books by a couple of decades.
See, e.g., Varley, supra note 39, at 449 (“Although de Soto writes as though he
invented the idea of giving the poor access to property in order to combat poverty,
international debate about regularization dates back to the 1960s, and in particular
to the work of John Turner. . . .”) (referencing J.F.C. Turner, Housing Priorities,
Settlement Patterns, and Urban Development in Modernizing Countries, 34 J. AM.
INST. PLANNERS 354 (1968)).
34. “[F]or some time now Brazil’s process of informal urban development has not
been the exception, but the main socio-economic effect was to produce urban space in
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dwellers do not have formal title to the land they live on nor to
their houses.  One member of the panel presenting on this topic, a
Brazilian law professor, explained a program to supplement the
informal ownership of the dwellings in favelas with formal legal
title to them.  He pointed out, however, that registration of title
would trigger a title registration fee equal to four months’ basic
income, as well as a subsequent obligation to pay taxes.  Thus, it
was very likely that as a result of titling, many of the favela
residents would lose their dwellings instead of having their tenure
made more secure by regularization of title.35
A second panel member, an inhabitant of the Cantagalo
favela,36 then explained the importance to him of acquiring title:  it
would bring him and others in his community into fuller and more
regular participation within the larger community.  In the ensu-
ing question and answer period, the resident was asked whether
he was concerned about the potential loss of his property through
failure to pay fees and taxes, or other costs such as utility bills.37
He insisted that it was most important to him to acquire the sta-
tus of owner and to secure a “place on the map.”  Others in the
room joined the conversation.  They explained that in fact many
favelas, those located on government land, did not appear on cer-
tain official maps at all, for they had been built on what was still
the country.”  Fernandes, supra note 7, at 203.  All cities with more than 500,000
inhabitants have favelas, as do 80 per cent of cities with 100,000 to 500,000
inhabitants, 45 per cent of those with a population of 20,000 to 100,000, and 20 per
cent of cities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. Id. In 2009, Rio de Janeiro had a
population of 6 million, with 1.25 million living in favelas and other informal
settlements. FERNANDES [2011], supra note 5, at 14. There are 1200 favelas in Rio.
Id. at 32.  In Latin America generally, in 2000
some 75% of the total population lived in urban areas, making it
the most urbanized region in the world. . . . It is estimated that
between 40 and 80 percent of the population lives illegally because
they can neither afford nor gain legal access to land near
employment centers. As a result, illegal tenure arrangements have
become the main form of urban land developments.
Fernandes [2002], supra note 5, at 6.
35. Similarly, David Harvey predicts that if regularização proceeds in Rio, by 2023
“all those hillsides in Rio now covered by favelas will be covered by high-rise
condominiums with fabulous views over the idyllic bay, while the erstwhile favela
dwellers will have been filtered off into some remote periphery.”  David Harvey, The
Right to the City, 53 NEW LEFT REV. 23, Sept.-Oct. 2008.
36. “[T]he Cantagalo project represents the first formal effort to give land titles to
slum dwellers in one of the oldest favelas” in Rio de Janeiro.  Crawford, supra note 4,
at 1105.
37. Electricity and drinking water are often pirated in favelas, and regularization
of title might make it easier for the utilities to identify who is using their services and
bill them, and perhaps cut off service.
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officially public forest land; that the concern of the Cantagalo resi-
dent was in part about acquiring an increased ability to negotiate
for social services such as utilities, sanitation, transportation, and
police protection, based on the newly confirmed ownership status;
that these were all part of moradia, roughly translated as a right
to housing, shelter, or dwelling; and that this in turn was part of a
right to the city and of citizenship (cidadania).
It is this dialogue that I seek to explore here.  I entered that
session thinking that regularization of title would be similar in
cultural significance to the transition a United States citizen
makes from renter to homeowner, a kind of confirmation of access
to the middle class and its engine of wealth.  Formal ownership
might or might not facilitate borrowing and commerce à la Her-
nando de Soto; but that analysis did not seem to be important for
anyone.  I did not expect to encounter so much emphasis on con-
nection, community, and a large and unfamiliar constellation of
attributes associated with the right to moradia, nor such an
emphasis on citizenship linked to an ability to dwell securely in a
place.
My puzzlement was amplified during the field trip we took
that afternoon to Cantagalo, which rises on the steep hillside
behind the Copacabana and Ipanema districts and their beaches.
The Cantagalo favela was subject to the new “pacification” pro-
gram in December 2009, pursuant to which the drug lords are
driven out of a favela and a community police force is installed
permanently on-site.38  In our interview with the resident police
captain, he explained that there was a three-part process for pacif-
ication.  First, he said, dominate the land.  Then, drive out the
drug lords.  Finally, establish the community force and work with
the residents.
Professor Crawford, serving as our translator, hesitated as he
translated the first step, and then did so literally. Afterwards, he
confirmed that the captain had said “Primeira dominar a terra.”
This might be translated variously along the lines of controlling
the terrain or territory. But to my ear “terra” leapt out – an
38. See generally Pacification Saves Lives, RIO REAL (July 29, 2012), http://
riorealblog.com/2012/07/29/pacification-saves-lives-the-first-full-blown-impact-study/
(describing the first study of the effectiveness of the favela pacification program);
Pacifying Police Unit, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacifying_Police_Unit
(last visited October 18, 2012); Matias Spektor, Taking Back the Favelas, IHT GLOBAL
OPINION, Dec. 2, 2011, available at http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/
taking-back-the-favelas/ (describing the policy of favela occupations).  The Cantagalo
favela was “pacified” on December 23, 2009, one of the earliest.
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emphasis on brute control of land as the basis for establishing a
safer and more functional and more secure community.  The two
conversations, morning and afternoon, resonated with one
another, and suggested to me that the assumptions I as an Ameri-
can brought to the relationship of property, place, community, and
citizenship needed to be reexamined in light of what seemed to be
a different way of understanding what it means to own property
(land) in a troubled and marginal community.
Authorities who have studied the impact of legalization in
various informal settlements elsewhere in Latin America some-
times echo the concerns expressed in the Rio study sessions I have
described, regarding the attractiveness of regularization of title,
even though “in some cases it may adversely affect people’s secur-
ity of tenure.”39  Ann Varley, for example, points out that
residents’ subjective sense of security is not linked only to legali-
zation of title, but often more importantly to the provision of ser-
vices, regardless of title,40 and to the length and stability of the
community.41  Nevertheless, becoming the real owner of one’s
home produces an additional satisfaction.42  Varley also notes that
various additional costs may come with legalization, depending on
the exact legal classification of the land: legal title may be refused
because of the location; legalization may increase tax assessment;
and legalization may undermine community’s political solidarity.43
In a recent article, Jean-Louis van Gelder writes:
There appears to be something inherently paradoxical
about legalization, as it has been shown capable of produc-
ing effects opposite of the ones intended. Legalization may
improve the efficiency of land markets and lead to capital
gains as a consequence of increases in the value of dwell-
ings, but it can simultaneously make land inaccessible for
the low(est) income groups and push them out of settle-
ments as a consequence of market forces. Additionally, the
intention of providing tenure security can be strengthened
by property rights, but also be undermined when service
39. Ann Varley, The Relationship between Tenure Legalization and Housing
Improvements: Evidence from Mexico City, 18 DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE 463, 477
(1987); accord, van Gelder, supra note 33, at 129-30.
40. Varley, supra note 39, at 465-67. Ward et al. found a similar sense of belonging
through homeownership expressed in focus groups they convened to study the effects
of formalizing title in colonias in Texas inhabited by Mexicans. Ward et al., supra
note 33, at 18.
41. Varley, supra note 39, at 468.
42. Id. at 476.
43. Id. at 477-78.
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charges and property taxes turn out to unaffordable for the
beneficiaries.44
Speaking generally about Latin American regularization pro-
grams, Edésio Fernandes opines that they have been “more suc-
cessful in upgrading settlements through public investments and
urban infrastructure and service provision than in legalization
programs.”45
Unless titling is undertaken within the context of a broader
set of public policies that address urban, politico-institu-
tional and socioeconomic conditions, legalization programs
may actually aggravate the processes of exclusion and seg-
regation. As a result, the original beneficiaries of the pro-
grams might not be able to remain on the legalized land,
although that should be the ultimate objective of regulari-
zation programs, especially on public land.46
In another recent article, van Gelder reports from a focus
group discussion with inhabitants in an informal barrio in Buenos
Aires that, “[f]or residents, having a property title, realistically or
not, implies inclusion in a society that has systematically denied
them entry.  As one resident put it: ‘Without papers it’s like we
don’t exist either.’”47  My Cantagalo resident is not alone in
expressing this sentiment, then.  Legal ownership equals exis-
tence, a place on the map.  Even if it imperils security of tenure.
B. The Brazilian Terms That Circulated That Day
The understanding of regularização articulated in my Study
Space discussions seems to be linked to moradia; to the right to
the city; to conception of the social function of property, which is of
constitutional dimension in Brazil; and to a certain conception of
citizenship (cidadania) via full participation in the city.  I explore
two of these terms more here, the right to the city and the social
function of property.  Concerning moradia, as Pindell points out,
both the right to the city and the social function of property
44. Jean-Louis van Gelder, What Tenure Security? The Case for a Tripartite View,
27 LAND USE POLICY 449, 450 (2010) (citations omitted).
45. Fernandes [2002], supra note 5, at 5.
46. Id.
47. Jean-Louis van Gelder, Tales of Deviance and Control: On Space, Rules, and
Law in Squatter Settlements, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239, 262 (2010) (citing focus group
discussion related to Jean-Louis van Gelder et al., Estar “en el aire”: Seguridad en la
Tenencia e Inversión en el Hogar en Cinco Barrios Informales de Buenos Aires, 62
MEDIO AMBIENTE Y URBANIZACIÓN 175 (2005)).
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involve some sort of increased access to housing.48
The “right to the city” is derived in various ways from Henri
Lefebvre’s oeuvre.49  Chris Butler, interpreting Henri Lefebvre,
describes the right to the city as a “right to urban life”50 that
involves a right to occupy physical space,51 a right not to be
expelled,52 a right not to suffer segregation,53 and a right to partici-
pation in all levels of decision-making.54  It also involves access to
all urban services. So it involves both habitation and participa-
tion.55  Tayyab Mahmud distills a similar list;56 and also stresses
that the “right to the city” is to be understood as “more than an
individual liberty to access urban resources, and [must] be seen
instead as a collective right to reshape the process of urbaniza-
tion.”57  Edésio Fernandes, an important Brazilian urban planner
and jurist, agrees. In discussing the “right to the city,” he lists a
number of concerns that Lefebvre identified as necessary to
update eighteenth-century Rousseauian civil rights.58  Zeroing in
on the right to the city, Fernandes articulates an overall right to
habitation—that is, “to fully enjoy urban life with all of its ser-
48. Pindell, supra note 2, at 439, 444-45.  For what more I have to say on the
difference between a right to moradia and right to housing, see supra note 6.  And I
am not treating the social function of the city as a separate matter from the social
function of property. See supra note 9.
49. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 7, describing its origins and providing an
interpretation referring to the critical legal geography movement in the United States
and Canada; Fernandes, supra note 7, at 205-08 (providing a derivation of the right to
the city from Lefebvre’s oeuvre); Pindell, supra note 2, at 440-41 (discussing
Lefebvre); Mark Purcell, Excavating Lefebvre: The Right to the City and Its Urban
Politics of the Inhabitant, 58 GEOJOURNAL 99, 101-03 (2002) (providing an
“extrapolation” of Lefebvre to modern conditions, id. at 101).  A volume of short essays
exploring the contours of the right to the city is available from UNESCO.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DEBATES: URBAN POLICIES AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY (2005),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146179m.pdf.
50. Butler, supra note 7, at 325.
51. Id.




56. Mahmud, supra note 33, at 69 (using “right to the city” to describe claims upon
adequate urban services, full use of urban space, rights against segregation and
expulsion, and active participation in all decision-making leading to the control of
social space).
57. Id. at 70.
58. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 207-08.  Some of these updates include “the right
to information; the right of expression; the right to culture; the right to identity in
difference and in equality; the right to self-management, that is, the democratic
control of the economy and politics; the right to public and non-public services; and
above all the ‘right to the city.’” Id. at 208.
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vices and advantages;”59 and a right to participation—that is,
“taking direct part in the management of cities.”60  Fernandes sees
“a vital link between cities and citizenship . . . given the escalating
urbanization of society at a global level.”61  David Harvey likewise
argues that the right to the city must be understood in terms of
the contemporary global phenomenon of urbanization and conse-
quent dispossession of the poor in vast numbers.62  Mark Purcell
points out that the participation aspect of the right to the city nec-
essarily involves adjusting the scale of politics to include the
urban local.63
Fernandes contends that law plays a crucial role in profound
legal reform leading to social inclusiveness and sustainable devel-
opment, and that Lefebvre’s political and theoretical writings on
the right to the city did not chart out any of this territory.64   But
Latin American countries have.  Fernandes identifies the incorpo-
ration of the “right to the city” into the Brazilian legal system, in
particular through Brazil’s 2001 federal City Statute65 as well as
the draft World Charter on the Right to the City.66  These laws
have led to important institutional reforms in Brazil, including
the creation of a Ministry of Cities in 2003;67 establishment of the
National Council of Cities;68 the National Program to Support Sus-
tainable Urban Land Regularization;69 and the National Cam-
paign for Participatory Municipal Master Plans.70  A separate
initiative resulted in a constitutional amendment providing a
social right to housing in 2000, with an implementing law enacted
in 2005.71
Fernandes situates the City Statute within an emerging new
urban-legal order characterized by intertwined collective rights;72
an emerging right to participation characterized by increased rep-
59. Id. at 208.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Harvey, supra note 35, at 29-40.
63. Purcell, supra note 49, at 103-07.
64. Fernandes, supra note 8, at 208.
65. Id. at 202, 211-15 (discussing Federal Law 10.257/2001, the City Statute).
66. Id. at 202, 215-17 (discussing the World Charter on the Right to the City).
67. Id. at 215; Fernandes, supra note 1, at 9-12.
68. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 215; Fernandes, supra note 1, at 12-13.
69. Fernandes, supra note 1, at 9-10.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 7.
72. These include “the right to urban planning; the social right to housing; the
right to environmental preservation; the right to capture surplus value; and the right
to regularization of informal settlements.”  Fernandes, supra note 7, at 211.
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resentative democracy; decentralization of decision-making
processes, especially at the municipal level; and clearer legal-
administrative frameworks.73  The City Statute builds on the
chapter on urban policy included in the 1988 Brazilian Federal
Constitution.74  Prior to 1988, “the lack of attention to urban and
territorial jurisdiction in the Constitution led, in the context of
Brazil’s contradictory federal system, to endless legal controver-
sies and institutional conflicts between federal, state and local
administrations as to which had the power to enact urban legisla-
tion and implement urban policy.”75  The 1988 Constitution con-
tained a specific short chapter on Urban Policy.76   Fernandes and
Rolnik identify some of the strengths of the 1988 Constitution,
including the requirement that the city’s social functions be devel-
oped through a municipal master plan;77 a clear balance between
the right to private property and limitations imposed by the social
function doctrine, including compliance with city planning;78 and a
type of adverse possession (usucapião) tailored to urban squat-
ters.79  Fernandes and Rolnik stress the importance of the new
usucapião right “with regard to programmes for the regularization
of favelas, since it probably applies, in theory, to more than half
the existing favelas.”80
73. Id.
74. Id. at 211, 214.  Fernandes points out that “until the 1988 Federal
Constitution came into force there were no specific constitutional provisions to guide
the processes of land development and urban management.”  Fernandes, supra note
1, at 4.
75. Edésio Fernandes & Raquel Rolnik, Law and Urban Change in Brazil, in
ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 141, 143 (Edésio
Fernandes & Ann Varley eds., 1998); see also Leonard Avritzer, Living Under a
Democracy, 45 LATIN AM. RESEARCH REV. 166, 167 (2010 Special Issue) (Although at
the end of the 20th century more than seventy percent of Brazil’s population were
urban dwellers, “Brazilian cities grew in an unfair, disorganized, and illegal way.
Unfairness was the result of a process of modernization without any kind of
planning—even when cities were planned, no space was reserved for the poor
population . . . .”).
76. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil October 5, 1988, tit. VI, ch.
II. (consists of arts. 182 and 183).
77. See Fernandes & Rolnik, supra note 75, at 147-48 (discussing art. 182 I).
78. Id. (discussing art. 5 XXI, XXII; art. 170 II, III).
79. Id. (discussing art. 183).  This provision allows an individual, male or female,
or a couple (married or not), one adverse possession of up to 250 square meters, of
private real estate used as a home or dwelling after five years’ occupancy, if the
possessor owns no other urban or rural property.  The five year time period is much
shorter that the otherwise applicable period for usucapiâo.  That would be twenty
years in most cases. See Pindell, supra note 2, at 450.  This is called a usucapião
special urbano. FERNANDES [2011], supra note 5, at 40.
80. Fernandes & Rolnik, supra note 75, at 147.
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This framework was implemented in the 2001 City Statute.
Fernandes identifies four dimensions to the City Statute: concep-
tual articulation of the constitutional principle of the social func-
tion of urban property and of the city; regulation of legal,
urbanistic and financial instruments for building a new urban
order; democratic processes for management of cities; and compre-
hensive regularization of informal settlements in private and pub-
lic urban areas.81  With specific regard to land-tenure
regularization, the City Statute established new legal forms for
transferring ownership of private land (that urban squatter-spe-
cific form of usucapião, adverse possession) and a legal form for
the concession of a real right to use public land (a specialized form
of lease).82 Fernandes notes that as to informal settlement regular-
ization, the City Statute and the 1988 constitutional provisions
behind it “fundamentally differ[ ] from the Hernando de Soto-
inspired formalization policies that have been given wide support
internationally, not least by international banks, ideological
think-tanks and development agencies.”83
Whatever its legal force, the broadly worded, aspirational
World Charter on the Right to the City84 is also instructive here as
a textual source for the concepts at play in Brazil and elsewhere in
Latin America and the Global South.85  Fernandes stresses that
this draft charter represents an international mobilization led, to
a considerable extent, by NGOs and urban movements from Brazil
and other Latin American countries.86  Among general principles
of the right to the city that the World Charter articulates are the
social function of the city (Article II.2) and the social function of
property (Article II.3). The proposed Charter’s broad guarantees
include access to and supply of domestic and urban public services
81. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 212.
82. Id. at 214.  This lease right can be registered, transferred, and inherited.
Fernandes, supra note 1, at 41.
83. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 214.
84. A proposed World Charter on the Right to the City (2004) is available at http://
www.dpi.org/files/uploads/publications/WorldCharterontheRighttotheCity-October04.
doc.  To be sure, the Study Space conversations that sparked this essay were not
directly referring to or relying on a document as esoteric and aspirational as the
World Charter, and I doubt it has legal force.  The concepts do hold some sway in
Brazil. See, e.g., Fernandes, supra note 7, at 215-17; Pindell, supra note 2, at 436 n.1,
442-45 (discussing the proposed World Charter).
85. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 215-17; see also Mahmud, supra note 33, at 71-72
(speaking generally, Mahmud calls the Charter a “promising development” that “[i]f
approved by the United Nations . . . would confer legitimacy to social movements of
the urban poor and slum-dwellers”).
86. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 215-16.
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such as drinking water, electric power, light and heating, health,
hospitals, schools, garbage disposal, sanitation facilities, and tele-
communications (Article XII); a right to transport and public
mobility (Article XIII); a right to habitable housing (Article XIV.1);
regularization of land ownership and improvement of precarious
neighborhoods and informal housing settlements (Article XIV.3);
and security of tenure (Article XIV.6).
The contours of the doctrine of the social function of property
are nebulous, especially if one tries to generalize across countries
and time periods.  Colin Crawford discerns a common theme of
emphasis on the use of property to promote human flourishing.87
Crawford expressly refers to the work of Martha Nussbaum and of
Amartya Sen on the development of human capabilities,88 in addi-
tion to the work of Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver.89
The concepts of human flourishing articulated by these authori-
ties are very open-ended and context-specific, but nonetheless do
provide, as they are implemented over time in specific contexts,
some kind of guiding principle or direction.90 In May 2011, Ford-
ham Law School held a symposium on the social function of prop-
87. Crawford, supra note 4, at 1089; id. at 1094-97 (discussing the concept of
human flourishing).
88. Id. at 1094, 1097 (discussing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITY: THE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (Belknap Press, 1st ed. 2011) and AMARTYA SEN,
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press, 2009)).
89. Id. at 1093, 1095-98 (discussing Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver,
Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 127 (2009)).
90. On the social function of property, see generally Thomas T. Ankersen &
Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform
in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 69, 89 (2006) (explaining the relationship of
the social function doctrine to land reform in various Latin American countries);
Daniel Bonilla, Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and
Property as a Social Function, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1135, 1154-55 (2011) (explaining
Duguit’s conception of the social function of property); Fernandes, supra note 7, at
204-06; Sheila R. Foster & A. Daniel Bonilla, The Social Function of Property: A
Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 102-05 (2011)  (discussing the
contours the social function of property according to its original exponent, Léon
Duguit); M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW; A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 205 (2004) (describing the origins of the “social
function of property” doctrine in Latin American constitutions in late nineteenth
century Catholic concerns to counter a Marxist critique of property; and its
deployment as part of land reform efforts); Flávia Santonini Vera, The Social
Function of Property Rights in Brazil (2006), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/
0tp371xs#page-1.  Santonini Vera’s work explores the introduction of the “social
function” into the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and its subsequent role in managing
land invasions organized by the Movimento Sem Terra (MST).  MST is a landless
worker movement that organizes occupations followed by very quick squatter
settlement, and is a different squatter issue legally and socially than that presented
by favelas and the possibility of regularization of ownership of parcels in them. For
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-2\IAL206.txt unknown Seq: 19  1-NOV-13 13:36
2013] BRAZILIAN REGULARIZATION OF TITLE 277
erty, bringing together Latin American and United States
property scholars to generate comparative perspective.91  This
seems to be the most recent overview of “the social function of
property” in the United States law review literature.  It is remark-
ably heterogeneous.92
Historically, the propagation of the concept that the state pro-
tects property only to assure that property provides a social func-
tion is attributed to French jurist Léon Duguit.93  Duguit
introduced it to Latin America in one of a series of lectures given
in Buenos Aires in 1911.94  “In South America, Duguit’s lectures in
Buenos Aires served to link his work and ideas to the legal devel-
opment of the region.  Based on Duguit’s work, drafters of Latin
American constitutions changed the way property was defined in
the first decades of the twentieth century.”95  Beginning with Mex-
ico in 1917, most Latin American and some European countries
incorporated the Duguitian idea of the social function of property
in their constitutions.96  Its reception in Brazil did not follow the
same path as in other Latin American countries, however, and
Brazil was not at first influenced by Duguit.97 The social function
of property was proposed but omitted from the text of Brazil’s first
Civil Code in 1916 and remained a “mere legal principle” until the
more on MST, see, e.g., Kevin E. Colby, Brazil and the MST: Land Reform and
Human Rights, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2003).
91. Most of the papers were published in Symposium: The Social Function of
Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1003, 1003-217 (2011).
92. See infra discussion in Section V.B as to whether the social function of
property doctrine actually means much of anything.
93. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 95 (discussing LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN
THE MODERN STATE (1919)); Foster & Bonilla, supra note 90, at 102-06 (discussing
Duguit); M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and
Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L  L. 191, 195 (2010) (discussing Duguit and his sources).
94. Mirow, supra note 93, at 196.
95. Id. at 195; see also M.C. Mirow, Origins of the Social Function of Property in
Chile, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183 (2011) (detailing the politics of the adoption of a
social function limitation on property in Chile in 1925).
96. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 95-96, 108; see also Gregory Alexander,
Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 733 (2003) (describing the German constitutional application of “social
obligation” to property); Rebecca Lubers, The Social Obligation of Property
Ownership: A Comparison of German and U.S. Law, 24 ARIZ. ST. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
389 (2007); Mirow, supra note 95 (origin of the social function doctrine in Chile);
MIROW, supra note 90, at 205-06 (addressing the social function doctrine in Spanish-
speaking Latin America).
97. Alexandre dos Santos Cunha cautions that Duguit’s conception was not the
source of the social function of property doctrine in Brazilian law, and in his view
Brazilian social function of property doctrine has only recently  and partially begun to
assume some of the broad contours of Duguit’s conception.  dos Santos Cunha, supra
note 8, at 1171.
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Constitution of 1934.98 Brazil’s 1946 constitution articulated the
concept of social function, but it became truly operational only
after the end of military government in 1985; the 1988 constitu-
tion makes several explicit references to the social function of
property.99  Alexandre dos Santos Cunha considers it especially
strong since the adoption of the 2002 Civil Code.100  Nowadays, the
social function doctrine is powerful in Brazil.101
III. THE UNITED STATES CULTURAL TAKE ON
HOMEOWNERSHIP IS NOT LIKE BRAZILIAN
REGULARIZAÇÃO AND MORADIA
This Section argues that in United States property rheto-
ric–both popular rhetoric and to a considerable extent legal aca-
demic rhetoric–themes of individual benefit, concern, and
economic or personal satisfaction dominate the discussion of
homeownership.  Themes of community and communal interest
such as those expressed in moradia, the social function of prop-
erty, and the right to the city are largely absent or are masked.
All agree that “[i]n the United States, home and home owner-
ship are held in high esteem. . ..”102 Here are typical reasons why.
“Households desire homeownership for many reasons: it delivers a
stable stream of housing consumption, a large degree of personal
control over the residence, access to superior housing stock and
98. Id. at 1175; see also Fernandes & Rolnik, supra note 75, at 154.
99. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5(XXIII) (Braz.)
(individual and collective rights and duties, providing that “property shall fulfill its
social function”); art. 170(III) (general principles of economic activity); art. 182(2)
(urban policy); art. 184 (agricultural and land policy and agrarian reform); art. 185
(expropriation for agrarian reform); art. 186 (defining the social function of rural
property).  Reference to the social function of property also appeared in the original
1988 version of art. 156(I) (authorization for municipal taxes). This provision was
amended in 2000, although the sense of authorization to tax for progressive purposes
remains. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art, 156(I) (Braz.). I am
working from an English translation of the Brazilian constitution that is available at
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html.  See also LEE J. ALISON,
GARY D. LIBECAP, & BERNARDO MUELLER, TITLES, CONFLICT, & LAND USE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND REFORM OF THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
FRONTIER 51-52 (1999) (discussing the importance of the “social function” doctrine in
plans for land reform at the time of the drafting of Brazil’s 1988 constitution).
100. dos Santos Cunha, supra note 8, at 1171, 1197-80.
101. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 118; dos Santos Cunha, supra note 8,
at 1181 (“the social function of property is not only well known and acknowledged by
both legal professionals and the general public in Brazil, but is also a structural
element of that country’s legal order”).
102. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255,
255 (2006).
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public services, important tax advantages, and unparalleled social
and status benefits.”103 In significant part, “[h]omeownership is
said to be a fundamental part of the American Dream because of
the economic security it gives homeowners.”104 Indeed, homeown-
ership is “the only effective form of wealth accumulation for Amer-
icans with modest incomes.”105 In addition to the perceived
financial benefits of homeownership, “for people with long-term
tenure in their homes, home is a source of feelings of continuity,
stability, and permanence.”106 Home is also the center of individ-
ual social networks and provides a physical tie to one’s workplace,
school, and so on.107 In 2006, sixty-eight percent of all American
households owned their homes.108 But there are major class and
race disparities in homeownership.109 Indeed, because of their gen-
erally more precarious position in society, Blacks and Latinos may
be particularly concerned about achieving homeownership.110
Recent examinations of the value of American homeowner-
ship have been inspired both by the rhetoric over eminent domain
when deployed against homeowners in the wake of Kelo v. City of
New London,111 and by the mortgage foreclosure crisis, in which
millions of households have been foreclosed upon or are at risk of
foreclosure, and many of them may have been lured into home-
ownership precisely because of the cultural values attributed to
it.112  Rachel Godsil and David Simunovich, for example, set out to
explore “why homeownership is so highly valued”113 as a predicate
103. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2008).
104. A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189 (2009); accord, Joan
Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326 (1988).
105. Williams, supra note 104, at 326.
106. Barros, supra note 102, at 279; accord, Dickerson, supra note 104, at 191.
Indeed, Akhil Amar sees long roots to this aspect of living in a house, identifying
dwelling as typical of an unenumerated right with a long constitutional past, both in
terms of privacy and of protection through the Takings Clause. Akhil Reed Amar,
America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1768-77 (2011).
107. Barros, supra note 102, at 279.
108. Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage
Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
956 (2008).
109. Id. at 958.
110. Id. at 959.
111. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
112. For example, Barros, supra note 102, is motivated in part by Kelo.  Dickerson,
supra note 104, is motivated by the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  Godsil & Simunovich,
supra note 108, are motivated by both, as well as the issue of the value of
homeownership raised in the wake of the Katrina flood in New Orleans in 2005.
113. Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 108, at 950.
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to asking whether and how loss of homeownership should be pro-
tected against or compensated.  They point out that the home is an
enormous financial asset and a principal source of wealth crea-
tion.114 In contrast, renting is viewed as throwing wealth down the
drain.115 For these authors, homeownership also has psychological
benefits and secures the locus of family and community.116 While
the home provides some emotional value, Godsil and Simunovich
focus on what they call the status achieved by homeownership.117
Their notion of status is dual – partly about ownership itself,
partly about establishing an individual-qua-owner’s greater worth
in society at large.118 The community ties that they identify as
associated with homeownership involve increased civic activity,
market transactions linked to home, better living conditions, and
economic activity – all coalescing to make a more cohesive
community.119
Without in any way deprecating Godsil’s and Simunovich’s
sophisticated analysis, I contend that it is nevertheless con-
structed around an individualistic conception of what it means to
own a home or lose a home.  Even the aspects that involve partici-
pation in community are articulated in terms of individual incen-
tives and disincentives that have aggregate effects.  The same is
true for other authors in the mainstream of United States scholar-
ship who write about homeownership, for example, Mechelle Dick-
erson, Lee Anne Fennell, and William Fischel.120  To be sure,
authors such as these ultimately are looking for solutions to vari-
ous problems on an individual, case-by-case basis: when, if ever,
should individual owners receive additional compensation for emi-
nent domain takings of their homes qua homes (Godsil & Simu-
novich); how to prevent individual losses of homes due to
mortgage foreclosure (Godsil & Simunovich; Dickerson); and how
to provide alternatives to unnecessarily precarious homeowner-
ship (Dickerson; Fennell).121 Missing in these analyses  and others
114. Id. at 954, 970.
115. Id. at 970.
116. Id. at 954.  Margaret Radin famously articulated this personhood function of
property, including the home. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN L. REV. 957 (1982).
117. Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 108, at 951-52.
118. Id. at 954.
119. Id. at 952, 969-73.
120. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 104, at 191- 92; Fennell, supra note 103;
FISCHEL, supra note 14.
121. Godsil and Simunovich, towards the end of their article, also explore Fennell’s
suggestion for designing legal instruments of homeownership that would split off the
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is communitarian rhetoric around having a place, belonging, and
entitlement to participation. Theirs is not at all an incorrect
approach, but one very different from the articulation of moradia
and right to the city that was put forward that fine day in Rio as
an explanation of the Cantagalo resident’s understanding of the
effects of regularization of title.
To be sure, homeownership as an ideal has come under criti-
cal scrutiny in United States academic property discourse, espe-
cially in the wake of the recent and ongoing mortgage foreclosure
crisis.122  Dickerson writes that “for many, attempting to become a
homeowner is a painfully short and ultimately unwise invest-
ment.”123  She ultimately proposes a number of policy
approaches–some dealing with unsound mortgages, others serving
to provide housing in forms not influenced by an obsession with
homeownership.124  Fennell’s innovative effort suggests to a way to
split off legally some of the investor’s potential financial risks and
rewards of homeownership from the consumption benefits.125   Cri-
tiques of this type, however, sound in the same mode. That is, they
ask what is advantageous for the individual as an investor or for
the investor’s personal security.
Joan Williams’ fine and classic article on the rhetoric of prop-
erty in the United States provides a different sort of critique of
homeownership.  She discusses at some length “the romance of the
single-family house,” but she also calls this rhetoric a “trance” and
an “American obsession with homeownership.”126 Although Wil-
liams praises the egalitarian republicanism expressed in the
United States myth of homeownership, she argues that it is sus-
pect in a number of ways.  She suggests, without exploring her
argument fully in this particular article, that the homeownership
myth reinforces a gendered sphere of domesticity, and that the
prototypical suburban single-family house ideal is exclusionary
value of the home attributable to off-site local factors such as schools, crime rates,
neighborhood amenities, as well as systemic factors.  Godsil & Simunovich, supra
note 108, at 996-97.
122. See generally Dickerson, supra note 104; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Home as
Ownership, Dispossession as Foreclosure: The Impact of the Current Crisis on the
American Model of ‘Home’, in THE IDEA OF HOME IN LAW: DISPLACEMENT AND
DISPOSSESSION 41 (Lorna Fox O’Mahoney & James A. Sweeney eds., 2011); Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., Homeownership – Dream or Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
CMTY. DEV. L. 17 (2012).
123. Dickerson, supra note 104, at 207.
124. Id. at 220-36.
125. Fennell, supra note 103, at 1063-70.
126. Williams, supra note 104, at 326.
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along lines of race and class.127  Elsewhere in the article, she sug-
gests that using an overarching concept of strong protection of
property rights puts the widely accepted and generally justifiable
notion of homeownership in the service of protecting large capital-
ist investments in property.128
Some United States accounts of homeownership do get a bit
closer to moradia and a right to the city.  I will briefly describe
here Tim Iglesias’ account of housing ethics, and will also note a
discussion of housing in the progressive property theory work of
Greg Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver.129  The astute reader
might note that the works discussed ultimately focus on providing
housing for those who don’t have it–a prelude to the discussion of
homelessness rhetoric assessed in the following section.130
Tim Iglesias presents a complex and sophisticated picture of
housing and homeownership in his description of five “housing
ethics” that have historically shaped United States housing law
and policy.131  They are (1) housing as an economic good, (2) hous-
ing as home, (3) housing as a human right, (4) housing as provid-
ing social order, and (5) housing as one land use in a functional
system.132 Iglesias argues that each of these ethics is a stable part
of United State housing policy, and that none is dominant.133  The
127. Id. at 328-29.
128. As Williams writes, “it remains to be proven that the need for a high level of
protection for the working class homeowner justifies an equally high level of
protection for the fondest dreams of [General Motors].” Id. at 294.  I agree, and have
argued elsewhere that there is a persistent dissembling about the nature of property
by advocacy groups sponsored by large landholders and industry.  Marc R. Poirier,
The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 189 (2002).
129. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY (2012) (advocating  an Aristotelian approach to property, based on
capabilities and human flourishing); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver,
Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 127 (2009); see also
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) (critiquing as
incomplete, misleading and problematic the self-interest model of homeowner
behavior, and offering a model based on virtue ethics). I also find persuasive Lorna
Fox’s accounts of the meanings of homeownership. See, e.g., LORNA FOX O’MAHONEY,
CONCEPTUALIZING HOME: THEORIES, LAWS AND POLICIES (2007); Lorna Fox, The
Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J. L. & SOC’Y 580
(2002); see also THE IDEA OF HOME IN LAW; DISPLACEMENT AND DISPOSSESSION (Lorna
Fox O’Mahoney & James A. Sweeny eds., 2011).  But Fox is British, and all but one of
the authors in the anthology are other than American; therefore these works are
beyond the scope of this essay’s inquiry.
130. See infra Section IV.
131. Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability,
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2007).
132. Id. at 511, 514-15.
133. Id. at 516-17.
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first two of his categories, housing as economic good and housing
as home, clearly belong to the individualistic, classic liberal core of
United States property rhetoric.  The last two in contrast display
some of the characteristic concern with interconnectedness and
function expressed in the Brazilian colloquy over regularization of
title, moradia and the right to the city.  In recognizing a rhetoric
of housing as “providing social order,”134 Iglesias expressly dis-
cusses the creation of community; though he properly notes that
by the same token housing also often creates exclusion along race
and class lines, and argues that this tendency must be com-
bated.135  In discussing an ethic of “housing as one land use in a
functional system,”136 Iglesias posits the kind of interconnected-
ness and right to the city that seem to have been expressed in the
dialogue with the Cantagalo resident and the seminar partici-
pants.  There are “functional relationships” between housing and
other land uses (e.g., shopping, water, open space, transportation,
schools, and medical facilities)137 and the goal is to “design[ ] and
promot[e] the development of a workable, livable land use sys-
tem.”138 Notably, Iglesias adverts to planning and environmental
modes of analyses.139  Both disciplines are often in tension here
with absolutist visions of private property ownership as they
account for positive and negative externalities generated by land
use that affects that community.140
Iglesias also presents housing as a basic human right.  He
begins by quoting a Catholic policy statement to the effect that
housing is not a commodity but a basic human right.141  This argu-
ment “focuses attention on the fact that decent, safe, and afforda-
ble housing is critical to proper human development.”142 Here we
do find some resonance with the broader implications of
moradia–not surprisingly, as both are human rights discourses.
And it is surely not an accident that a Catholic articulation of a
134. Id. at 553-69.
135. Id. at 589.
136. Iglesias, supra note 131, at 569-83.
137. Id. at 569-70.
138. Id. at 570.
139. Id. at 570-71.
140. For an account of the inevitable tension and negotiation around property,
environment, and community, see Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment,
Community, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 43 (1997).
141. Iglesias, supra note 131, at 540 (quoting Admin. Bd. U.S. Catholic Conference,
Homelessness and Housing: A Human Tragedy, A Moral Challenge: A Statement 3
(1988)).
142. Id. at 540.
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human right to housing would resemble the Brazilian approach to
some degree, as both recognize the social function of property, and
as one might expect Brazilian legal discourse to be influenced by
Catholic teaching.143 All the same, in his discussion, Iglesias notes
the focus of human rights discourse on individual entitlements144
and not on social policy that conceives of housing as one use in a
functional system.145
The right to housing receives a different inflection, and one
fairly close to Brazilian moradia, in the course of recent theoreti-
cal writing by Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver.146  Alex-
ander and Peñalver derive their overarching conception of
property neither from utilitarian premises nor from classic liberal
premises, but from what they call Aristotelian premises.147  The
core concept is attention to human flourishing.148 As an example of
their theory in practice, they examine the case of Modderklip East
Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.,149 which involved a
squatter invasion of private property in light of the South African
constitution’s dual commitments to protect private property and
to provide the homeless squatters with housing.150 Alexander’s and
Peñalver’s argument is not mainstream United States property
theory at all, but an explication of their progressive, quasi-com-
munitarian critique of other theories of property ownership in
light inter alia of this specific South African example.
IV. UNITED STATES HOMELESSNESS RHETORIC: THE
FUNCTION OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND OF
“NO PROPERTY”
At some point in my reflection on the gap between regulariza-
ção and moradia on the one hand and United States property
143. See MIROW, supra note 90, at 205 (noting the origins of the social function of
property doctrine in Latin American law as a nineteenth-century Catholic response to
a Marxist critique of property).
144. Iglesias, supra note 131, at 540.
145. Id. at 541 n.143.
146. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 129.
147. Alexander, supra note 146, at 753-73; Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 129,
at 130-45.
148. Alexander, supra note 146, at 745, 748-50, 760-73; Alexander & Peñalver,
supra note 129, at 134-45.
149. Modderklip East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd., 2004 (8) BCLR
821 (SCA), aff’d on other grounds, 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).
150. Alexander, supra note 146, at 786-91; Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 129,
at 154-60.
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jurisprudence’s assessment of the meaning of homeownership on
the other, it occurred to me that many of the concerns voiced by
the Cantagalo resident and the Study Space seminar participants
were in fact parallel to those addressed in the United States
homelessness advocacy literature from the 1980s onward.151 Per-
haps I was looking in the wrong place.
It turns out that the United States homelessness advocacy
literature also tends to focus on homeless individuals, not societal
patterns of formally landless communities. Thus, it debates
whether individuals are responsible for their homelessness (in
which case perhaps we ought not to help them); or whether insti-
tutions are responsible for individual homelessness (in which case
perhaps we ought to reform those institutions).152  Writing in 2000,
homelessness advocate Maria Foscarinis described two decades of
homelessness advocacy as follows:
In broad outline, early legal advocacy focused on address-
ing immediate basic needs of homeless persons, such as
shelter and food, through both litigation and then legisla-
tion. Later legal advocacy focused on prevention, such as
discharge planning and transitional housing, and on estab-
lishing political and civil rights, again through both legisla-
tion and litigation.  Current legislative efforts are focused
on longer-term solutions, such as housing and access to
mainstream programs; current litigation is focused on
access to mainstream programs as well as challenges to
efforts to “criminalize” homelessness.153
The connection between homelessness, housing, place, and inte-
gration into the full workings of community–which I might call
full citizenship–is rarely articulated. Instead, much of the home-
lessness literature seems to address piecemeal causes, desert, and
stopgap measures to get individuals food and places to sleep and
urinate other than the street.  The whole matter is approached in
terms of individuals and institutional reforms.
That is not always the case, to be sure.  Foscarinis argues for
151. Iglesias, supra note 131, discussed in Section III infra, basically makes an
affordable housing argument.
152. For a variety of perspectives within these general parameters, see, e.g., Robert
C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 17 (1992); Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its
Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 1 (1996); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless
Legal Advocacy:  New Challenges and Directions for the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1215 (2003).
153. Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated
Strategy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327, 329 (2000).
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using a right to housing to address homelessness, even if such a
right was long ago denied recognition by the United States
Supreme Court.154  Relying on a right to housing articulated in a
number of United Nations documents, most notably those related
to Habitat I155 and Habitat II,156 Foscarinis does place homeless-
ness in larger contexts of proximity to work, social services and
transportation, economic and community development, housing,
and jobs.157  The human rights approach seems to allow both an
individual articulation and a community-regarding one.
Many of the threads I have been following about the possible
blind spot in United States homeownership and homelessness dis-
course are pulled together in an insightful essay by Jane Baron.
In Homelessness as a Property Problem, Baron argues that
because homelessness has been formulated as a problem of pov-
erty, we have asked “a limited, almost formulaic set of questions
concerning the depth of the problem . . .; the scope of the problem
. . .; and the cause of the problem (‘Is homelessness a product of
individual weakness or of structural forces beyond any individ-
ual’s control?’).”158 Baron argues that:
[t]he literature on homelessness is structured roughly
around two competing hypotheses.  The first is that home-
lessness is mostly the result of personal failures such as
substance addiction, mental illness, or inability to hold a
job.  The second competing hypothesis is that homelessness
is mostly the result of institutional forces beyond any indi-
vidual’s control such as a mismatch between the supply
and demand for low cost housing or global changes in the
job market that have all but eliminated well-paying entry
level jobs.159
154. Maria Foscarinis, The Growth of a Movement for a Human Right to Housing in
the United States, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 35 (2007); Foscarinis, supra note 153, at 342-
54. The case she refers to is Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).  This case was
actually about a tenant’s security of tenure, but is widely understood to negate any
argument for a Substantive Due Process right to housing.
155. The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat I) occurred in
Vancouver, Canada, from May 31 – June 11, 1976. See Report of Habitat: United
Nations Conference on Human Settlements, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 70/15 (1976), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/3566_
45413_HS-733.pdf.
156. The Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II)
took place in Istanbul on June 3 – 14, 1996. See Istanbul Declaration on Human
Settlements, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.165/14 (Aug. 7, 1996), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/025/00/PDF/G9602500.pdf?OpenElement.
157. Foscarinis, supra note 153, at 345.
158. Baron, supra note 19, at 273.
159. Id. at 279.
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Baron also describes a synthesis of these first two approaches, a
“vulnerability” argument in which some combination of personal
failure and structural forces causes homelessness.160  But this syn-
thesis analysis, just as much as its two component analyses, is
grounded in a “rhetoric of individual responsibility” that “may be
affirmatively harmful” in understanding homelessness.161 Baron
suggests that an important element is missing from these modes
of analyzing homelessness. I agree.
Baron proposes to look at the deprivations of the very poor–no
protection from hunger and cold, uncertainty about where they
will sleep, no place to bathe–not in terms of poverty as such, but in
terms of what they do not own.162  This “no property” state of
affairs subjects them to “a complex set of disabilities.”163  Baron
here elaborates on the well-known argument made by Jeremy
Waldron, in an essay entitled Homelessness and the Issue of Free-
dom,164 that the homeless are not free because they have no place
to perform freedom.  Baron essentially argues that the homeless
have no place in which to perform a large number of basic human
functions.  Noting that the United States Supreme Court has held
there is no constitutional right to housing,165 and that wealth is
not a suspect class justifying judicial intervention under a strict
scrutiny standard,166 Baron argues that “the ‘no-rights’ add up: no
right to be anywhere, no right to have anything, no right to keep
what you do have, etc.”167 The homeless end up in “a complex legal
state in which one is literally a shadow, a photographic negative of
the complex constellation of qualities and attributes that consti-
tute wealth.”168
I do take issue with Baron on her last point, as I think she has
committed a minor misstatement.  It is not only wealth that the
homeless lack, but place.  To borrow Virginia Woolf’s phrase, they
160. Id. at 280-82.
161. Id. at 282.
162. Id. at 284.
163. Id. at 284-85.
164. Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV.
295 (1991).
165. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
166. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
167. Baron, supra note 19, at 285.
168. Id. A similar argument is made by Canadian geographer Nicholas Blomley.
Nicholas Blomley, Homelessness, Rights, and the Delusion of Property, 30 URBAN
GEOGRAPHY 577, 578 (2009).  Blomley builds on Baron, supra note 19, and Waldron,
supra note 164, contributing in addition the important argument that blindness to
this dimension of homelessness is part of a fundamental political process that
obscures how homelessness is produced.
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lack “A Room of One’s Own.”169 And, as a consequence of a lack of a
place to dwell that they own, the homeless lack stable relation-
ships to neighbors, to various public services, and to the city itself,
and therefore they lack a foundation for full citizenship.
Baron does make a gesture in this general direction.  Having
a secure place for one’s body, personal possessions, and bodily
functions (part of owning property in the sense I think Baron
intends to direct us towards) is also about securing one’s relation-
ships. In a short, tantalizing paragraph, Baron refers to Wesley
Hohfeld’s seminal theoretical work portraying property not as
things owned but as sets of correlated relationships between peo-
ple around things.170  Baron argues that “[a]s non-owners in a
world of owners, the homeless have many duties to respect the
rights of others, and liabilities to the powers of others, without
themselves having property that would give rise to duties and lia-
bilities on the part of others towards them.”171  This condition ren-
ders the homeless distinctly vulnerable.172
Baron explores her important argument about “no property”
as paucity of secure relationships at somewhat greater length in a
later essay, Property and “No Property.”173  She posits that prop-
erty is social, and involves relationships with others, and there-
fore necessarily implicates politics.  Baron asserts that “[p]ersons
owning very few things inhabit a realm of severe social and legal
vulnerability, susceptible to the power of many (and, of course, the
government) without having (m)any reciprocal power(s) over
others.”174
In her concept of the problem of “no property,” Baron articu-
lates much of what motivated the Cantagalo informant to desire
legal title despite its perils, and what seems to inhere in moradia
as it was discussed that day in Rio and as I understand it.  I would
like to examine further the idea that having a place to live is an
essential element in personal, social, and political relationships.
One can get there by understanding human beings as relational in
a number of ways—the material basis of society, but also the cul-
tural.  The communitarian framing of property comes to mind,
169. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1989)
(1929).
170. Baron, supra note 19, at 287 (discussing Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 15 (1913)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Jane B. Baron, Property and “No Property,” 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1425 (2006).
174. Id. at 1427.
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with its emphasis on networks, dependence, and interdependence
as the basis for both human flourishing and citizenship.  Greg
Alexander, in his social-obligation account of property, touches on
this. Human beings engage in social networks not because we
choose to and could walk away, but because our human condition
is in fact utterly dependent on them.175
Andrea Brighenti’s illuminating essay on territory as rela-
tionship is also helpful here.176 Brighenti argues that, “[w]hereas
the most widespread view takes territory as the hard fact which
provides the visible support or backup of invisible social ties, it
may be more interesting to explore how every type of social tie can
be imagined and constructed as territorial.”177  Territory has to do
with basic human functions, such as defense, control, reproduc-
tion, and access to resources.178  But territory is not simply about
access to land, the ability to be seen to be on land, but about
“processes of inclusion and exclusion in the construction of social
groups. . . .”179 It is about identity formation as well as access to
175. Alexander, supra note 146, at 765.  I wish I could also rely here on Eduardo
Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005), as the title is so
wonderfully suggestive of an argument that acquiring property (especially in order to
dwell on it) can generate entrance into community, something like the right to the
city.  And indeed, Peñalver contrasts and critiques “property as exit”, the use of a
right to exclude and other property rights to withdraw. Id. at 1895-938.  But
Peñalver’s examples of “property as entrance” do not line up with the moradia/ right
to the city/citizenship concerns particularly well.  He describes “strong entrance” that
can be used to construct an alternative “normative community”, id. at 1940-47; and
“weak entrance,” which is about participation in markets and socialization. Id. at
1948-55. His assessment of how homeownership functions to generate community will
be familiar to United States readers, as it develops the notion that ownership of a
home ties one down to the community and generates the need for more participation,
both politically and through markets. Id. at 1949-51.  None of these arguments seem
to me particularly resonant with using property ownership to achieve entrance into
the complex of rights and relationships articulated by moradia and the right to the
city.  Peñalver is not wrong in what he says; it’s just a missed opportunity.
Baron does better here in her 2006 essay.  It demonstrates the connection
between ownership and citizenship by analyzing a recent novel whose plot often turns
on certain characters’ exclusion from property ownership.  Baron, supra note 173, at
1431-38 (analyzing VALERIE MARTIN, PROPERTY (2003)).  Neither the married woman
character (in an age of coverture) nor the slave character has much room to
maneuver, because they cannot be property owners.  And owning a house plays a role
too, as the wife inherits a house, which of course immediately belongs not to her but to
her husband. Id. at 1433.  But this example is not all that close to the apparent
cultural significance of formal title to a home to the Cantagalo resident.
176. Andrea Brighenti, On Territory as Relationship and Law as Territory, 21 No. 2
CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 65 (2006).
177. Id. at 66-67.
178. Id. at 68.
179. Id.
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Zoe Loftus-Farren’s very fine student comment on tent cities
provides an excellent catalog of the benefits afforded by tent cities,
one type of informal community.  It also illustrates why Waldron’s
account of homelessness and property is insufficient, and what
Baron’s and Brighenti’s theories could be understood as pointing
towards.181 Loftus-Farren notes that “[b]ecause academic litera-
ture on tent cities is sparse, many of these benefits have not been
extensively documented or studied.”182 She is starting her descrip-
tion fresh, a good thing.  To begin her catalogue, she notes “com-
munity and autonomy,” including stable access to friends and
neighbors, the ability of couples without children to live together
(an arrangement not typically permitted in homeless shelters,
which are usually sex-segregated), autonomy of schedule, and
safety of person and possession.183  Well-functioning tent cities
develop self-governance, in terms of security, services, health con-
cerns, and so on,184 in turn fostering the “self-reliance, determina-
tion, and capability” of most of their residents.185 Tent cities “can
also foster increased political mobilization and participation,”186
“put[ting] a spotlight on the lack of affordable housing and chal-
lenges faced by the homeless in the United States.”187  This inevi-
table visibility of the underlying political and economic plight of
tent city residents can generate media attention, advocacy,
volunteerism, and political response.188
180. Id. at 71.
181. Loftus-Farren, supra note 26, at 1050-57.  Another very helpful account is
Sheila Foster’s analysis of the construction of hundreds of community gardens on
vacant lots, and havoc wreaked in the New York neighborhoods when those lots were
converted to other purposes. See Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space:
Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527 (2006).  The
community gardeners were squatters whose relations over time generated additional
important, nurturing, stabilizing relations (Foster describes them as social capital)
because of their land use in proximity to one another.
182. Loftus-Farren, supra note 26, at 1057.
183. Id. at 1050-51.
184. Id. at 1052-54, 1055-57.
185. Id. at 1054.
186. Id. at 1051.
187. Id. at 1054.
188. Id. at 1054-55.  It can also generate response by socially progressive and
politically active churches. See, e.g., City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church
of Christ, 211 P.3d 406 (Wash. 2009) (invalidating on freedom of religion grounds
city’s permanent ban on church allowing temporary encampment of homeless);
Loftus-Farren, supra note 26, at 1069-70; Kelli Stout, Comment, Tent Cities and
RLUIPA: How a New Religious-Land-Use Issue Aggravates RLUIPA, 41 SETON HALL
L. REV. 465 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-2\IAL206.txt unknown Seq: 33  1-NOV-13 13:36
2013] BRAZILIAN REGULARIZATION OF TITLE 291
As Loftus-Farren writes in introducing the benefits section of
her Comment, “Tent cities provide a number of benefits to home-
less individuals that are absent in homeless shelters or life on the
streets.  Specifically, encampments can provide residents with
community, potential for self-governance, security, stability, and
increased self-reliance and autonomy.”189  To my mind, all of the
important benefits she catalogues derive from a stable community
that is providing individuals a place to live or dwell.  It’s not just
about individual autonomy, increased choice, and self-reli-
ance–one way of reading Waldron.  Informal settlements that
function well provide community and connection, in just the way
indicated theoretically by the Brazilian concepts of moradia, the
right to the city, and cidadania.  Loftus-Farren has provided an
excellent illustration without using the Brazilian theory.  But of
course, as she, Larson, and others point out, United States juris-
prudence largely fails to account for informal communities at all.
V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN BRAZILIAN AND UNITED STATES ARTICULATIONS OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND HOMELESSNESS
There are several possible reasons for the differences explored
in the preceding sections between the two cultures’ discourses on
homeownership, homelessness, and property more generally.
Each of these hypotheses is brief and invites further research.
A. Differences in Land Ownership and the History of
Land Distribution
One factor in explaining the difference in current United
States and Brazilian sensibilities around squatter communities
and property surely is the different histories of the United States
and Brazil concerning land distribution, from colonial times for-
ward.  This difference has historical and ideological dimensions.
From the outset of Western property practices in Brazil, most peo-
ple living in Brazil had no land to call their own, and conse-
quently, no place they could call their own.  As one account noted,
“Brazilian colonial history resulted in large latifundios.”190  This
concentration of land ownership continues to this day.191 “At the
189. Loftus-Farren, supra note 26, at 1050.
190. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 102; see dos Santos Cunha, supra note
8, at 1172-74 (providing a brief history of Brazilian land law).
191. In contemporary Brazil, one percent of the population of Brazil owns 46% of
the land.  Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 102.
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end of the twentieth century, Brazil [stood] as the prime global
example of the largest concentration of land in the fewest
hands.”192
In contrast, the settler society in the many colonies that came
to comprise the United States often did distribute land widely one
way or another, at least to White settlers.193  Moreover, early on
the United States embraced an explicit policy of distributing land
to settlers who used it, through 19th century preferences, and
homesteading laws beginning in 1862.194  It is immaterial for our
limited purposes here exactly how this United States policy devel-
oped or whether it always functioned–for example, how much of it
can be attributed specifically to Thomas Jefferson’s vision of a
nation of yeoman farmers. It was an ideology of widely-shared
land ownership. Also, certainly the liberal, anti-royalist ideology
of individual rights linked with individual property ownership
articulated by James Harrington, John Locke, and William Black-
stone informed United States public lands policy in a way that
would later result in wide distribution of land.195  Such distribu-
tion would in turn reinforce an individualistic cultural under-
standing of property in land and an assumption that ownership of
one’s place and dwelling was a norm of citizenship to be aspired to.
192. E. Bradford Burns, Brazil: Frontier & Ideology, 64 PAC. HISTORICAL REV. 1, 12
(1995).
193. Not of course to indigenous populations, whose interests were physically and
legally subjugated, systematically and mostly in short order.  And not  by recognizing
other systems of private or communal ownership in the Spanish/Mexican Southwest.
See, e.g., STEVEN W. BENDER, TIERRA Y LIBERTAD: LAND, LIBERTY, AND LATINO
HOUSING 17-27 (2010) (chapter entitled “Southwest Ranchos: Land Grants and Land
Loss”); Placido Gomez, Comment, The History and Adjudication of the Common
Lands of the Spanish and Mexican Land Grants, 25 NAT.  RESOURCES J. 1039 (1985);
Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicano/Chicana Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the
Edge of a “Naked Knife,” 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998).
194. A series of 19th century laws allowed squatters to purchase federal land first if
it were ever to be privatized. See, e.g., EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K.
KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE
THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 62-63 (2010). For one classic history of federal land laws, see
JOHN OPIE, THE LAW OF THE LAND: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FARMLAND
POLICY 31- 84 (1987). See generally ANDRO LINKLATER, MEASURING AMERICA: HOW THE
UNITED STATES WAS SHAPED BY THE GREATEST LAND SALE IN HISTORY (2002)
(describing the surveying and distribution of public lands west of the Ohio and
Mississippi Rivers); Pindell, supra note 2, at 468-72  (briefly describing squatter and
land claims in United States history). Opie also provides a useful overview of land law
in the colonial period and the period of the Articles of Confederation. OPIE, supra note
194 at xvii-xxi, 1-30.
195. See OPIE, supra note 194, at 29-31 (discussing the influence of the natural
rights philosophies of Harrington and Locke on the United States approach to private
property).
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Depression-era federal policies to encourage homeownership (at
least among some populations–minorities were, notoriously, rigor-
ously excluded)196 were a natural successor to these policies. And
the current United States rhetoric would follow.
I must underscore that this account of United States land pol-
icy and its ideological traces apply to whites.  Aziz Rana’s The Two
Faces of American Freedom analyzes United States land policy
and ideology in the framework of white settler theory and persua-
sively argues that the ideology of ownership and freedom main-
tained and transformed throughout much of United States history
suppressed both ownership and citizenship for non-Whites.197
Anthony O’Rourke’s astute review essay on The Two Faces of
American Freedom suggests that Rana’s analysis can be carried
forward to explain the current role of homeownership in American
politics, with its race and class disparities.198 O’Rourke’s sugges-
tion is worth exploring.
B. The Social Function Doctrine and the Right to the
City
The difference between the dominant United States dis-
courses on homeownership and homelessness and the Brazilian
approach to homeownership in the context of regularização is
likely also related to the prevalence of the doctrine of the social
function of property in Brazilian law and social theory and its
absence in United States property discourse, as well as the cog-
nate concept of the right to the city.
One could legitimately ask how much content the social func-
tion of property can be relied on to have.  In this regard, an inter-
esting debate broke out toward the conclusion of Fordham Law
School’s 2011 symposium on the social function of property.  As I
recall it,199 two United States scholars took the position that the
196. See, e.g., Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal
Changes in Banking Regulations Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 193-94 (2005); KENNETH T.
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 203-15
(1985).
197. See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010).
198. See Anthony O’Rourke, Theorizing American Freedom, Review Essay, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1101 (2012) (reviewing AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM (2010)).
199. This discussion is not reflected in the published papers, with the possible
exception of some doubts expressed by dos Santos Cunha at the conclusion of his
published symposium piece.  dos Santos Cunha, supra note 8, at 1181.  The reader
will have to trust the author’s recollection of what happened.
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social function doctrine was important, at the very least in order
to broaden the concerns understood to be encompassed within the
concept of property, and therefore to legitimate the participation
of various stakeholders in articulating their claims about
resources and human flourishing.  Two Brazilian authorities dis-
agreed. Alexandre dos Santos Cunha took the position that the
meaning of the doctrine was variable, country- and case-specific.
Edésio Fernandes maintained that it had no meaning at all.
Each of the participants in this little colloquy had a point, in
my view.  There is little predictable content ex ante and in the
abstract in the notion of the social function of property.  Perhaps
the best one can do is, like Colin Crawford, to assess a number of
examples and discern a common theme of emphasis on the use of
property to promote human flourishing.200 This would not be the
only example of a broad and differentially interpreted principle
modifying classical liberal property rights.201
So Brazil and other Latin American jurisdictions share a
social function doctrine, though it takes different forms.  In con-
trast, the United States, in practice and in jurisprudence, contin-
ues to operate with a classical liberal-era constitution drafted in
1789 and an individualistic conception of property; it has never
expressly reformed its key articulation of property protection in
light of subsequently-emerging conceptions of social and economic
rights.202  Ankersen & Ruppert note this lack of evolution, and find
200. Crawford, supra note 4, at 1089; see also id. at 1094-97 (discussing the concept
of human flourishing).
201. I have in mind the public trust doctrine, which as applied in various
jurisdictions has taken on a variety of forms with at best a family resemblance to one
another. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and Western Water Law: A
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573 (1989); Robin Kundis
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrine: Public
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Towards an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern
Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State
Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Marc R. Poirier, Modified Private
Property: New Jersey’s Public Trust Doctrine, Private Development and Exclusion, and
Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2006).
One article that explores this connection is Hanno Kube, Private Property in Natural
Resources and the Public Weal in German Law – Latent Similarities to the Public
Trust Doctrine?, 37 NAT.  RESOURCES J. 857 (1997).
202. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 6-98.  Ankersen & Ruppert note that
the United States constitution provides for eminent domain power for “public use” if
“just compensation” is paid, U.S. CONST. amend. V.  They argue that expropriation in
Latin America is different in scope under the “social function” doctrine than in the
United States under “public use.”  Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 97-98.  I
would argue that the concept of private property in general may be understood
somewhat differently in light of the broader claim of supervening need made by the
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it “remarkable that a doctrine so fundamental to private and pub-
lic law in many countries in the world has received so little atten-
tion in comparative legal literature in the United States.”203 Foster
and Bonilla write that “the conventional account in U.S. law and
theory situates the individual owner as insulated from the
demand by others in society and owing no further obligation to
them, except for the duty not to cause harm to others and their
property.”204  The classical liberal approach identifies “the ‘core’ of
property rights with individual autonomy and . . . relegate[s] the
limitations on autonomy to the ‘periphery’ of property rights.”205  It
is against this still dominant classical liberal background that
social-obligation theorists of property–Gregory Alexander,
Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler among
them–have sought to shift the discourse.206
C. Invisibility of Squatter Communities in the United
States
Jane Larson, in the second of her articles describing Mexican
colonias in Texas, asserts that large informal communities are
basically understudied in the United States.207  In the process of
social function doctrine.  Indeed, the differences between different national
conceptions of the relationship between private property rights on the one hand and
socially-motivated regulation and expropriation on the other have been put in play by
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and are the subject of significant
scholarship about the nature of property rights across nations and legal cultures. See,
e.g., Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes
of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851 (2003); David Schneiderman, Investment
Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 57 (2000); David
Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996).
203. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 90, at 119; accord, Gonzalez, supra note 33,
at 256 (“the English-language literature on the social function doctrine is quite sparse
notwithstanding the significant interest in this doctrine in Europe and Latin
America”).
204. Foster & Bonilla, supra note 90, at 1008- 09 (citing Alexander, supra note 146).
205. Id. at 1011.
206. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 146; Gregory Alexander, Property & Propriety,
77 NEB. L. REV. 667 (1998); Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 129; Gregory S.
Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph William Singer, & Laura Underkuffler, A
Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009); Peñalver, supra
note 129; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE
OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENTS (2000);
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
207. Larson, supra note 26, at 158-59; accord, Ward et al., supra note 33, at 5 (few
people are aware of the extensive informal self-help communities in Texas and
elsewhere in the United States); see also PETER M. WARD, COLONIAS AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN TEXAS AND MEXICO: URBANIZATION BY STEALTH  98, 242-43  (1999) (arguing
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commenting, often critically, on an earlier article by Larson about
colonias, Richard Delgado observes that informal settlements
most certainly are ubiquitous, but they are also ignored.208  And
indeed surely they will be visible to the subordinated communities
themselves and to an academic such as Delgado, whose identity
and career are intimately linked with tracking and explicating the
plight of such groups.  Several types of informal squatter commu-
nities, past and present, have appeared in United States history –
in addition to colonias, tent cities in times of economic trouble, for
example.209  And one might argue that large cohorts of undocu-
mented workers living six, eight, ten, or twenty to an apartment,
illegally (that is, in violation of housing codes), collectively com-
prise an informal settlement.  Nevertheless, Larson and the
others have a point.  Our public and legal discourse on land own-
ership, homeownership, and property has been insufficiently
attentive to informality and hence to informal community.210
To some extent this may be an effect of race and class segre-
gation in the United States, which geographically produces invisi-
bility. Colonias and tent cities, especially in peripheral and rural
areas, may stand outside the literal view of the powerful, just as
they appear to do in United States property theory.  In contrast,
during my week in Rio the favelas of the South Zone were visible
everywhere on the slopes that surround the more prosperous
asphalt streets211 and the beaches.212  A country that has always
had massive populations with no secure place to live, no place on
the map, may experience pressure to develop property law in prac-
tice and theory that addresses the needs of those populations.
that in the 1960s and 1970s Texas cities ignored peripheral colonias because they
were relatively distant); id. at 108 (arguing that more recently Texas cities have
addressed colonias in terms of disaster relief, water, and wastewater services, but
have not viewed them as a structural problem of modes of housing production and of
poverty).  Indeed, Ward points out that Texas only responded to the conditions in
colonias as a result of visibility in the form of international criticism for cholera and
other Third World conditions in a First World country. Id. at 119-20, 131, 242.
208. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, 85
GEO. L.J. 667, 678 (1997) (commenting on Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the
Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995)).
209. See, e.g., Loftus-Farren, supra note 26; see also NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE
HOMELESS, TENT CITIES IN AMERICA: A PACIFIC COAST REPORT (2010).
210. Larson, supra note 26, at 158.
211. Cariocas sort themselves and their territory into those who live no asfalto – on
the level, asphalt-paved, wealthier areas near the beaches – and those who live no
morro – on the hill, that is, in the favelas.
212. To be sure, the large favelas of the North Zone weren’t discussed much, and I
got the sense they were off limits, beyond the reach of favela tourism. Not so
picturesque, perhaps, or riskier.
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One could take Gregory Alexander once again as an example
of a minority thread.213  Alexander does write in an impassioned
way about the plight of squatter communities and the need to
bend protection of private property with a right to housing to
address the needs of these communities.  He links landless com-
munities and tenure, in a way reminiscent of the Cantagalo
informant that fine day in Rio.  As he and Peñalver point out, the
squatter communities described are ubiquitous, visible every-
where in South Africa.214  Whether Alexander’s social-obligation
conception of property was influenced by such vast homelessness,
or simply confirmed by it, is unimportant.  In a planet with a bil-
lion squatters,215 our property conceptions could well take note of
the right to dwelling as a claim to inclusion in community.  In
United States property jurisprudence, for the most part, they do
not.
There may also be a politically (to me) unacceptable elision in
United States property discourse, in the way it favors thinking
about home, homeownership, and place in terms of the individuals
who either own homes, rent, or are homeless. In the United
States, as abroad, there are vast disadvantaged populations who
collectively have “no property” as Baron articulated the concept.
As Carmen Gonzalez has pointed out in her critique of the de
Sotoist assumption that formalized property ownership is better
because it will create wealth, perhaps United States jurispru-
dence needs to deal with squatter settlements on their own terms.
Gonzalez writes:
Far from representing a failure of formal law, informality
constitutes a parallel and intersecting system of law devel-
oped by the urban poor in the face of daunting economic
hardship.  Formal and informal property systems coexist
and influence one another. . . .
213. M.C. Mirow has written an amusing short book review in the form of a letter to
Justice Antonin Scalia, contrasting Scalia’s view of property with that of Professor
Alexander, who teaches at Cornell Law School.  Mirow argues that the social-
obligation norm, despite a trend in academic interest exemplified, if not led, by
Professor Alexander, is not very much part of United States property jurisprudence.
He concludes with a suggestion for a slogan: “Ithaca, ten square miles of social-
obligation norm surrounded by reality.”  M.C. Mirow, Book Review, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC.
147, 155 (2008) (reviewing GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006)).
214. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 129, at 175-76.
215. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (2006); Mahmud, supra note 33, at 11-
40 (describing the social processes that generate slums from a Marxist perspective);
ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD
(2006).
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What matters in the end is guaranteeing that every mem-
ber of society has adequate shelter, decent jobs, a good edu-
cation, and access to health care.216
Gonzalez suggests that some of the condemnation of informal sys-
tems is mistakenly attributed to the notion that the Global South
has a generically failed legal system, when the cause is actually a
failed economic system brought about by neoliberal reforms and
massive rural-to-urban migration.217
Larson similarly suggests that the informality of squatter
communities itself is in tension with United States legal the-
ory–there appears to be no law there to analyze–and that this is
part of the explanation for inattention to informal communities.218
Rather, as Peter Ward points out,
colonia-type housing production in the United States – as
elsewhere in the world – is invariably highly rational given
prevailing socioeconomic constraints that prevent people
from homesteading normally.  In short, there is little about
colonias that is “strange”, or even surprising.  The only
strange thing, perhaps, is that the phenomenon has not
been more widely recognized.219
D. United States Jurisprudence Treats as Suspect
Vague Principles of Human Rights (Especially
Those of Foreign Origin) and Disdains
“Progressive Realization” of Them
Some of the United States property jurisprudence’s reluc-
tance to engage with the law of informal communities stems from
the fact that high-level human-rights principles are vague and
also of foreign origin, and that the on-the-ground solutions in
informal communities are ad hoc and often non-transferable.
Both of these circumstances run up against a preference in United
States property theory to see property rules as fixed and stable
and universal, even when they may in fact be situation specific
and re-negotiated regularly.  For the first observation, discussed
216. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 258-59.
217. Id. at 254-56; see also Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56
AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2008) (presenting and critiquing the notion of generally failed law
in Latin America).
218. Larson, supra note 26, at 158-59.
219. Peter M. Ward, Informality of Housing Production at the Urban-Rural
Interface: The “Not So Strange Case” of the Texas Colonias, in URBAN INFORMALITY:
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTH
ASIA 243, 243 (Ananya Roy & Nezar Alsayyad eds., 2004).
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in Section V.D., I rely on Jane Larson; for the second and third,
discussed in Section V.E, I rely on Carmen Gonzalez, Daniel
Bonilla Maldonado, and an assortment of property theorists,
including Joan Williams, Laura Underkuffler, and my own
writings.
In looking to describe a mechanism to improve over the long
term the lot of those living in informal colonias, Jane Larson looks
beyond an immediate complete resolution, turning instead to the
notion of “progressive realization” that is used to structure the
working of some human rights principles, especially positive social
and economic rights.220  Larson relies specifically on the Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Political Rights,221 which articulates a
currently un-implementable right to adequate housing.222  She
points out that United States jurisprudence typically does not
regard any of this as law, but rather as economic and social pol-
icy.223  “In general, negative rights provide the norm of legal rules
in our tradition rather than positive rights.”224  Yet the gravamen
of the cultural understanding of regularization of title we have
been exploring sounds precisely in a broad, vague, not yet fully
implementable right.  No wonder United States discourse, with its
different and narrower tradition as to what counts as human
rights law, might assess things differently.
So the problem is not simply a question of a gap between
human rights law and enforcement, a charge sometimes made
about Latin American legal systems generally.225 It is whether
aspirational human rights law counts as law.
220. Larson, supra note 26, at 178-81.  Larson writes that “ ‘[p]rogressive
realization’ provides a regulatory conception for imposing aspirational standards
while calibrating compliance obligations to available economic resources.’” Id. at 179.
221. Id. at 177-78 (discussing the Economic Covenant, supra note 6).
222. Id. at 177-79.
223. Id. at 178-79.  “Since 1981, the United States has maintained that economic,
social and cultural rights ‘belong in a qualitatively different category from other
rights, that they should not be seen as rights but as goals of economic and social
policy.’” Id. (quoting U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 36th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/40/C.3/SR.36
(1985), quoted in Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States
Parties’ Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 158 (1987)).
224. Id. at 177-78.
225. See, e.g., MIROW, supra note 90, at 235; van Gelder, supra note 44, at 454 (“In
Latin American countries, . . . which historically have poor human rights records and
strong liberal traditions of their Constitutions and Civil Codes, human rights
approaches are particularly vulnerable from an enforcement point of view.”).
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E. Is an Extralegal Legal System Legitimate Law?
The Problem of Legal Monism
In her assessment of formal and informal property approach
to the global housing crisis, Carmen Gonzalez makes a different
but convergent point to Larson’s.  For Gonzalez, holding a debate
between formality versus informality is a “red herring.”226
“[I]nformality constitutes a parallel and intersecting system of law
developed by the urban poor in the face of daunting economic
hardship.”227  Gonzalez’s own study and other studies responding
to de Soto’s claims show that informal property solutions are prag-
matic, ad hoc, and likely each one to be sui generis.228   Yet many of
them function adequately to provide security of tenure and mar-
kets in property.  As Gonzalez writes, “[t]he advantages and dis-
advantages of formal and informal title must be evaluated on a
case by case basis.”229  But this ad hoc, improvisatory quality may
make the whole issue of managing communities informally seem
not a proper topic for a law professor or advocate.  Our old, famil-
iar, individualistic, liberal discourse of law and property may
seem a better-fashioned legal tool.  Even if it doesn’t particularly
fit.
As van Gelder, among others, points out, a simplistic legal/
illegal dichotomy masks inquiry into “de facto and/or perceived
tenure security, which are both empirical issues.”230  Characteriz-
ing the question of security of tenure in informal communities as
one of legal pluralism, as some authorities do, may be helpful;231
but to me it also threatens to re-inscribe a desire to discern a clear
one-size-fits-all alternative legal system, another set of rules,
rather than particularized inquiry into what are, as Gonzalez
insists, always local conditions.232
226. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 258.
227. Id.
228. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also NEUWIRTH, supra note 215,
at 25-173 (discussing squatter communities in Rio de Janeiro, Nairobi, Mumbai, and
Istanbul, some of which are successful without the tool of formal title to property).
229. Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 258.
230. Van Gelder, supra note 44, at 454; see also van Gelder, supra note 33, at 132-
40 (presenting an example of one kind of empirical study).
231. Van Gelder, supra note 44, at 454 (citing, inter alia, two classic studies:
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and
Reproduction of Legality in Pasagarda, 12 L. & SOC’Y REV. 5 (1977); Kenneth L.
Karst, Rights in Land and Housing in an Informal Legal System: The Barrios of
Caracas, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 550 (1971)).
232. See van Gelder, supra note 47, at 242 (agreeing, at least in part, by stating:
“Applying legal pluralism to informal settlements requires envisioning them as
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Daniel Bonilla Maldonado provides a magnificent theoretical
framework for this underlying concern in his important article
Extralegal Property, Legal Monism, and Pluralism.233  His theoret-
ical argument about the shortcomings of a one-size-fits-all
approach to property and land law was developed in the course of
a six-month study of how informal property transactions func-
tioned on the ground in the community of Jerusalén, in Ciudad
Bolivár, Colombia.234  In this article, theory meets practice.
Bonilla Maldonado defines legal monism as “the idea that
there must be one and only one centralized hierarchical legal sys-
tem in each state.”235 Indeed, he argues, “[p]roperty in the West
has conceptually depended on legal monism.”236 The supposed vir-
tues of legal monism in property include principles of equality,
legal security, legality, political unity, and maintaining social and
political order.237  Supposedly, legal monism in property offers
unity, clarity and simplicity, facilitating individuals’ decision
making processes.238 A unified system also contributes to overall
legitimacy.239 And–notably from my point of view–Bonilla Maldo-
nado writes that “legal monism is necessary for the consolidation
of a modern market economy,” as it promotes “[t]he circulation of
capital.”240
having proper normative systems with a ‘law’ that is different from and somehow
resident outside that of the state legal system.”). But cf. id. at 242-43, where van
Gelder posits another set of dichotomous norms- a legal/illegal within the informal
settlement.  Van Gelder among others also suggests an additional way of approaching
informal property arrangements in various communities, conceding of a continuum
with chaos at one end and full formal legal order at the other. Id.  at 240-41. I find
this proposal also problematic, for it still privileges the formal, legal approach when
many informal approaches function as effective property law within their
communities.
233. See generally Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal Monism,
and Pluralism, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 213 (2009).
234. Id. at 213 n.1.  The case study itself appears in the second half of the article.
Id. at 226-38.  Bonilla Maldonado writes that the case study “illustrate[s] the
descriptive and normative shortcomings of legal monism, as well as the usefulness of
certain tools provided by legal pluralism for comprehending the reality of property as
it actually exists in the Global South.” Id. at 215.
235. Id. at 213; see id. at 216 (expanding on this argument).
236. Id. at 213.
237. Id.; see id. at 217-18 (expanding on this argument).
238. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Extralegal Property, Legal Monism, and Pluralism,
40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 213, 220 (2009).
239. Id.
240. See id. (citing DE SOTO [2000], supra note 32, at 7, 10).  The question about
whether facilitating sales of land is good for an informal community proved the
occasion of a spirited discussion in the Q & A session at Edésio Fernandes’s 2009
lecture at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.  A questioner pointed out that a hotel
owner anxious to buy hillside favela property would require formal title, not just
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Carol Rose provides one kind of account of what is going on
here.
[T]he clarification of formal title is useful precisely because
it makes the status of property knowable to outsiders, that
is, to strangers to the community. . . . Formal title gives
assurances to any stranger at all who may want to
purchase the property.  Thus, formal title potentially
introduces strangers into the community, through a form of
property assurance that is not at all “natural” to a close-
knit community.241
Exposure of the community’s land (and thus the community) to a
market consisting of a world of strangers raises concerns of the
kind associated with anti-globalization.242  There is a loss of a
sense of local or national control243 because “formal title puts a
barrio house into play in an economy that is much larger than the
local community.”244
To Rose’s view one might juxtapose Ann Varley’s.  She
emphasizes that the local nature of extralegal property systems
makes them resistant to the full force of the market.245 But these
local systems do reflect the investment and social capital involved
in self-help housing. She notes “incredulity” when she asked infor-
mal residents whether they would be likely to sell their homes.246
For them, the effort in building from scratch, the sacrifice, was
great.  “In these circumstances, housing means more to people
than shelter or an economic asset.  It has become part of their life
informal property arrangements that might suffice within the favela community.
Fernandes countered that the questioner was relying on an absolute sole ownership
model of property, when in fact collective ownership, and thus collective sale, were
also possible.  Fernandes alluded to Islamic models of collective land ownership in
Egypt, which he claimed functioned well in those local contexts.  The host contributed
the recollection that a particular congressman from Rio de Janeiro who advocated
regularização also had said publicly that once formal titling was accomplished, he
stood ready to buy hundreds of parcels.  There followed further discussion about
whether collective ownership really would facilitate free market transfers of property
and whether, to the extent that it impeded it, that might well be a good thing.  It was
pointed out that cooperative and condominium models of ownership actually account
for a significant portion of United States property ownership.  Fernandes lecture
2009, supra note 33, at 71:30-76:00.
241. Carol M. Rose, Privatization – The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
691, 703 (2006).
242. Id. at 704.
243. Id. at 704-05.
244. Id. at 705.
245. Varley, supra note 33, at 455 (questioning whether this local aspect is a defect,
as de Soto maintains); see also DE SOTO [2000], supra note 32, at 5.
246. Varley, supra note 33, at 457.
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story–and not only their own story, but the story of their fam-
ily.”247  So they were less likely to want to sell.
Ngai Pindell makes a related point here.  “Because favela
residents obtain legal title to their property as a result of [titling]
programs, these residents are able to make economic choices that
may negatively impact neighbors.”248  Part of the issue is unre-
strained fee simple ownership. To be sure, one could address these
issues to some extent by imposing accumulation and exit
restraints.249  Also, as Fernandes and others point out, title need
not be established in fee simple form.250
But Bonilla Maldonado is actually more concerned about
something else.  One of his principal disputes with legal monism is
that it is simply inadequate to describe the way real property
works in the Global South.251  Vast populations in these regions
live in informal settlements.252 “[I]f we want to understand the
way in which property is interpreted and exchanged in a large
part of the Global South, we must question the supposed unity,
homogeneity, and exclusivity of state property law.”253  Official
state law and parallel extralegal systems are paired, dynamic,
and interactive.254  Any account that omits extralegal systems is
woefully inadequate as a descriptive matter, he asserts.255  Two
fundamental theses of legal pluralism are that “it is an error to
identify rights with state law because the center of gravity in law
is not the State, but the society;”256 and that in fact a plurality of
legal systems co-exist and need to be studied as such.257
For extralegal systems, which are “created from the bottom
247. Id.
248. Pindell, supra note 2, at 457.
249. Id. at 458.
250. See supra note 240 (discussing a colloquy, at a 2009 lecture by Professor
Fernandes, supra note 33, concerning the effects of the commodification of land when
informal use receives formal title).
251. Bonilla Maldonado, supra note 233, at 221.
252. Id. at 221-22.  Among prevalent coexisting property regimes are those
involving indigenous populations, and those governing dealings in the peripheral
districts of major cities. Id. at 219-20.  Of which there will be more than fifty in excess
of five million inhabitants by 2015. Id. at 221 (citing DE SOTO [2000], supra note 32, at
85).
253. Id. at 223.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 228.
257. See id. at 229 (stating:  “Legal pluralism seems to be part of the reality in most
contemporary States and not all legal pluralism in colonies or ex-colonies can be
explained starting with the relationship of these places with the metropolis,
extralegal property being one example.” ).
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up,”258 “may adequately reflect and protect the interests of those
directly affected by the informal system—a question which cannot
always be predicated on the state property regime.”259  In addition,
extralegal systems are “flexible, adaptable, and sensitive to con-
text.”260 They may also be more accessible to local residents than
the formal property scheme, conceptually and practically, and
thus have an egalitarian function.261
Edésio Fernandes’s critique of de Soto strongly parallels
Bonilla Maldonado’s argument about the flaws of legal monism in
accounting for law in informal settlements.  Fernandes critiques
de Soto’s work because it “has failed to qualify the discussion on
property rights; . . . he seems to assume that there is a universal,
ahistorical, ‘natural’ legal definition of such rights.”262  Throughout
Latin America and the developing world, Fernandes writes, “the
state has treated differently the different forms of property rights
. . . and the social relations around them, allowing for varying
degrees of state intervention in the domain of economic property
relations.”263  Land and real estate however are often treated dif-
ferently, under a “dominant individualistic approach” applied uni-
versally, rather than under the notion of the social function of
property.264  Fernandes argues that any analysis that sees formal
property rights as a sine qua non for security of tenure is flawed.
In many developing countries under certain conditions, “residents
in informal settlements can share an effective perception of secur-
ity of tenure, have access to . . . credit and public services, and
invest in housing improvements, even without having legal
titles.”265
One source of this misleading focus on the formal and univer-
sal is the legal academy. A short paragraph in Bonilla Maldo-
nado’s article castigates Latin American academics for “teach[ing]
and writ[ing] their books as if legal monism was the rule and not
the exception.”266  Extralegal property’s existence is typically not
even mentioned in courses and books on property rights, a situa-
258. Id.
259. Id. at 225-26.
260. Id.  In a related argument, Bonilla Maldonado writes that extralegal systems
can serve to address cultural diversity. Id. at 226.
261. Id. at 225-26.
262. Fernandes [2002], supra note 5, at 7.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. (internal citation omitted).
266. Id. at 222.
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tion he deplores.267  Bonilla Maldonado’s point here overlaps quite
directly with my project in this Essay, inasmuch as I have identi-
fied a rather a significant gap in mainstream United States prop-
erty jurisprudence where certain accounts of the function of
property in informal communities ought to be.  His criticism about
excessive focus on a monistic concept and the consequent lack of
attention to description of on the ground practice is telling.268
There is something about United States property discourse in
general that is especially averse to informality, situation specific-
ity, and fluidity.  This partly is about nothing more than a generic
compulsion of our legal authorities to try to articulate broadly
applicable rules.269  Property law may be especially susceptible to
this tendency to oversimplify and rigidify, as we think and hope
that property is prototypically about owning things (solid,
unchangeable, to achieve stability, but also fungible so that they
can be bought and sold) rather than managing community rela-
tionships, however that may occur.  A rigid concept of property as
object of ownership generates a rigid property rhetoric.270  Savvy
property theorists can take account of the need to change rules by
acknowledging that property is fixed, then changes, and then is
fixed again.271
One strand of United States property theory recognizes that
267. Id. at 223.
268. Ann Varley makes a similar point in her interesting article critiquing analyses
of formal title versus informal housing arrangements for excessive reliance on
dualisms, because dualisms abstract from context.  Varley, supra note 33.  She
invokes a feminist critique of abstract dualisms.  For Varley, understanding why
residents of informal housing behave the way they do, why they attempt to sell or do
not attempt to sell, what their house means to them, is always inflected by their
personal experience and by the local conditions.  For Varley, “[t]he logic that leads to
dichotomy ‘flees from the sensuous particularity of experience, with its ambiguities,
and seeks to generate stable categories.’” Id. at 459 (quoting IRIS MARION YOUNG,
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 98 (1990)).
269. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal
Studies, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779, 783 (1992) (compulsion of legal discourse to
provide solutions or visions); Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REV.
2053, 2056 (1993) (describing typical legal academic desire to emulate judges by
pronouncing rules).
270. See, e.g., Poirier, supra note 140, at 43-44 (deploring the use of the “property
rights encomium” to laud unchangeable property rights when in fact some adjustment
has become grievously necessary in light of changed environmental conditions).
271. The classic treatment is Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REV. 47 (1988); see also Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Theme
and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1. I have argued that the
promise of fixed value during regulatory transition, if believed and acted on in good
faith, invites folks to participate in an ongoing negotiation about property and
community.  Poirier, supra note 128, at 172-73.
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two approaches to property coexist, one formal, rigid, and natural-
ized, the other repeatedly negotiated.  Joan Williams calls the for-
mer the “intuitive” model and seeks to expose it, encouraging
instead a conversation about the welfare of the community.272
Similarly, Laura Underkuffler identifies an absolute view of prop-
erty and an overall more wide-ranging, comprehensive view.273  As
she points out, the first version of property is ultimately individu-
alistic and self-regarding, while the second is both self- and other-
regarding.274  Both Williams and Underkuffler argue for getting
past the absolute or rigid approach, in order better to accomplish
the broader social goals served by property.275 As Underkuffler
points out, the concept of property is “of central, almost emotional
importance.”276  The stakes in renegotiating the concept of prop-
erty are deep and at once personal and political; they implicate
who we are as individuals and what it is that society promises us.
So while the second, pragmatic account is undoubtedly a more
accurate description of property practice, there may be advan-
tages to dissembling.277 Maintaining a façade of stable property is
socially useful.278
Property theorists in the United States may have in the backs
of their minds a suspicion of straying too far from a rhetoric of
property as generally applicable rules about individuals and what
they do and do not own.  In Brazil, we are looking at a different
rhetoric, of vague rights to dwell, of property ownership as a gate-
way to community, unenforceable as a whole, implementable only
piecemeal and ad hoc.  This rhetoric may seem inadequate, per-
haps even incomprehensible, as law.  In short, it may be in part a
clinging to a particular formal, universalizing, and ultimately nar-
row version of what property law is about—an allegiance to legal
monism—that accounts for the difference in United States prop-
erty rhetoric on regularizing title and homeownership.
272. Williams, supra note 104, at 278-879.
273. See generally Laura Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127
(1990).
274. Laura Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J. L.
& JURIS. 161, 167-68 (1996); see Poirier, supra note 128, at 112 n.76 (collecting sources
on this point).
275. Indeed, Underkuffler writes “[t]he Supreme Court’s ostensible use of an
absolute approach to property results in a kind of patent dishonesty . . . .”
Underkuffler, supra note 273, at 143.
276. Id.
277. In a concluding section of an article on vagueness in takings doctrine, I raised
the question, “Can We Talk About Property As Process?  Should We?”  Poirier, supra
note 128, at 186-91.
278. Id. at 187-89.
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VI. CONCLUSION
My investigations in this Essay have turned out to be an affir-
mation of localism, specificity, and complexity in property law the-
ory and practice.  They suggest that we should approach with
considerable wariness the kind of generalized claims for property,
and in particular for homeownership, that are a stock in trade for
many property rights advocates, among them many legal
academics.
To understand properly the impact of regularização in Rio (or
a similar formalization of title in any other megacity of the Global
South) requires a sophisticated and case-specific analysis of law,
social and cultural context, and what Bonilla Maldonado calls
extralegal property.279  In the case of the Rio favela dweller, home-
ownership is informed by the broader concepts I encountered—a
right to housing/moradia/dwelling, a right to the city, a social
function of property, and a kind of participatory notion of citizen-
ship/cidadania.  As we have seen, these concepts themselves are
variously articulated in various settings.   And, one should note,
they are not always extralegal—implementation will often involve
municipal law by design, as Edésio Fernandes so strongly points
out is the case in Brazil.280  Municipal law is of course local, varied,
and potentially can be more democratic and participatory than a
distant and in some cases autocratic national government.281
Meanwhile, back at the ranch in the United States, I do sense
an increasing interest in legal academia in exploring what it
means to own a home in analyses that are more nuanced, for
example by taking into account race, class, and also gender.  This
strand of property scholarship has always existed, but the recent
mortgage foreclosure crisis, the differential impacts of homeown-
ership in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and other storms,
the general hard times, and a substantial increase in class differ-
entiation seem to have prompted more and more varied studies.282
279. Bonilla Maldonado, supra note 133, at 213; see FERNANDES [2011], supra note
5, at 9 (“[T]he evidence indicates that successful regularization initiatives have to be
designed to fit the facts and history of the particular informal settlement and country
context”); id. at 46 (recommending a customized approach to regularization policies).
One aspect of this variability may also be to consider different types of legal rights
aimed at producing security of tenure and preserving communities for their current
inhabitants. Id. at 41-42 (discussing possibilities).
280. Fernandes, supra note 7, at 202; see also Mahmud, supra note 33, at 34-40.
281. In the case of Brazil, advances in regularization and general devolution of
authority over urban areas to municipalities have occurred in the context of an overall
process of democratization.
282. See, e.g., Carole Necole Brown, supra note 27 (describing her theory of the
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In addition, historical and demographic studies of how ownership
works and doesn’t work for cohorts considered separately and spe-
cifically as to race, class, and gender are also extraordinarily
important.283 Effectively, this scholarship critiques legal monism
as to the identity characteristics of the homeowner.284  It is not an
racial discrimination against African Americans present in the dual mortgage market
for home financing); Dorothy Brown, supra note 27 (analyzing disparities in Black
and White homeownership in terms of race and class, and proposing tax code reforms
to address the disparity); Dickerson, supra note 104 (arguing for an overhaul of U.S.
government homeownership subsidy policy so as to minimize predatory lending
practices, and establish a system of consumers who make housing choices based on
economics instead of emotions); Dyal-Chand, supra note 122, at 44, 54 (arguing that
“the American equation of ‘home’ as ‘owned home’ can be measured along racial lines”,
and then exploring changes in policy in the Obama administration that move from a
conception of home as investment to one of home as shelter); Dyal-Chand, supra note
27 (presenting a case study of predatory lending to low-income households in the
United States as a way of testing Hernando de Soto’s hypothesis about the
advantages of propertization of informal property); McFarlane, supra note 27, at 855
(comparing generalized assertions about the benefits of homeownership to the actual
experiences of Blacks and Latinos, discerning systematic differences, and asserting
the need for a “right to keep”); Salsich, supra note 122 (arguing for the automatic
inclusion of financial counseling and mediation in residential lending practices, as
well as urging more attention be paid to the value of renting as a means to increasing
the stability of the residential housing market); Warren, supra note 27 (analyzing the
interplay between racial classification, access to homeownership, predatory lending
practices and bankruptcy risk in the United States); Heather Way, Informal
Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113,
118 (2009) (referring to the effect of Katrina and other storms on informal
homeowners in the South).
283. See, e.g., BENDER, supra note 193; DAVID CORREIA, PROPERTIES OF VIOLENCE:
LAW AND LAND GRANT STRUGGLE IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO (2013) (a history of the
land grant struggle in northern New Mexico); Gomez, supra note 193 (describing and
challenging the U.S. court system’s treatment of land grant disputes in the American
Southwest, effectively converting what were once communal lands into the public
domain of the U.S. sovereignty); Luna, supra note 193 (analyzing and challenging the
internal logic of the land grant doctrine in the context of Chicano/Chicana land
dispossession in the American Southwest, and calling for international law remedies
to this dispossession pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); McFarlane, supra
note 27, at 890-907 (presenting a history of instability in Black and Latino
homeownership); MARÍA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND
GRANT AND THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1840 – 1900 (2005) (a
history of the land grand dispute in northern New Mexico). See generally ALFRED
BROPHY, ALBERTO LOPEZ & KALI MURRAY, INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY, LAW &
RACE (2010).
284. Another aspect of the emerging scholarship prompted by the mortgage
foreclosure crisis and the Great Recession is to take seriously alternatives to fee
simple home ownership as a long-term approach to security of tenure, whether this be
renting, community ownership, or more novel models.  This project is not altogether
new – especially perhaps in the context of how to manage the equity in low-income
housing. But we can see better how important a piece of the puzzle it is. See generally
Arlo Chase, Rethinking the Homeownership Society: Rental Stability Alternative, 18 J.
L. & POL. 261 (2009); James J. Kelly, Jr., Maryland’s Affordable Housing Land Trust
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-2\IAL206.txt unknown Seq: 51  1-NOV-13 13:36
2013] BRAZILIAN REGULARIZATION OF TITLE 309
abstract “A” who owns Blackacre.  In Audrey McFarlane’s words,
these studies reveal, in contrast to the general assertion that
homeowner confers stability, “an alternate reality of property
ownership: a reality of recurring instability.”285
It would also behoove United States property scholars to con-
sider regularly and systematically various instances of more-or-
less stable informal communities and their uses of legal and extra-
legal property.  This might well take the form of Elinor Ostrom-
like case studies.286  Some such scholarship exists.  In addition to
colonias,287 tent cities are emerging (again) in these hard times,
and perhaps in response a study of tent cities is emerging as
well.288  Stable community gardens are also possibly relevant to
the matter at hand.289 Michele Anderson’s project on unincorpo-
rated urban edges is also useful.290  Typically undisciplined by a
general law, or at least less so, these informal dwelling arrange-
ments in some sense share the characteristics of favelas and other
types of informal communities in Latin America and the Global
South.291  More study of various informal dwelling arrangements
in the United States and their uses of property language might
also better inform the ongoing theoretical debate about where
property comes from and how it lives, breathes, and functions.
Act, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMM. DEVELOPMENT L. 345, Spring/Summer 2010;
Pindell, supra note 2, at 473-78  (considering land banks as a United States analog to
Brazilian right to the city measures).
285. McFarlane, supra note 27, at 860.
286. Annette Kim notes the similarity between Ostrom’s case study work in the
area of natural resources and case studies of informal housing.  Annette M. Kim, A
Market Without the ”Right” Property Rights: Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam’s Newly-
Emerged Private Real Estate Market, 12(2) ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 275, 279 (2004).
287. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 26; Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the
Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995); Ward et al., supra note 33; Ward, supra note
219; WARD, supra note 207.
288. See, e.g., Loftus-Farren, supra note 26.
289. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 181.
290. Anderson [2010], supra note 26; Anderson [2008], supra note 26.  For example,
one might productively compare Peter Ward’s observations a decade or so earlier of
the way in which poor living conditions in Texas colonias were maintained and
ignored  because they were not incorporated into cities but remained part of
peripheral country jurisdictions.  Ward, supra note 219, at 255 (observing that the
weakness, lack of effective process, and failure to provide services of county
governments contribute to the development of informality in Texas colonias); WARD,
supra note 207, at 118 (same).
291. See, e.g., Dyal-Chand, supra note 27 (using United States poor and informal
housing to test de Soto’s hypothesis as to the effect of formal title on informal
communities in the global South); Ward et al., supra note 33 (comparing inhabitants
of colonias along the Texas/Mexico border to those living in informal communities in
Mexico and Latin America).
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Often, United States jurisprudence fails to pay any attention
at all to informal communities.  Moreover, it may well dismiss a
general, aspirational rights framework that might validate why
we should care how such informal communities function—includ-
ing moradia, right to the city, social function of property, and so
on.292  One of the purposes of the social-obligation theorists is and
should be to remedy that gap in our account of property.  They
should tell us about how dwelling works, not just formal owner-
ship.  Sheila Foster’s accounts of the functions and perils of urban
commons might be one place to start.293  The resources managed
by informal arrangements could well be thought of in property
terms.
A fundamental theoretical question is whether property law
and jurisprudence are to be local and concrete or universal and
abstract.  If anything is to be gleaned generally from this Essay, it
is that accounts of housing, homes, homelessness, and dwelling
require attention at the local level, not beginning with some
abstract account of property ratified by a legal monist approach.294
Property jurisprudence around homeownership requires study in
situ, and being aware of what has been called the “interlegality” of
formal and informal property systems.295   What is required strikes
me as not unlike the work that Elinor Ostrom and those working
with her have produced when they study varied ways of managing
common pool natural resources by a local community, from the
bottom up, as it were.296 And indeed Sheila Foster has argued that
informal property housing systems often are, precisely, bottom-up
solutions to managing urban commons of the sort addressed by
concepts like moradia and the right to the city.297  Accurate
descriptions of informal property systems will help us better to
292. Cf. Iglesias, supra note 131 (discerning several strands in homeownership
jurisprudence, some of which incorporate connectedness and others of which reflect
classical liberal views).
293. Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 57 (2011); Sheila R. Foster, Urban Informality as a Commons Dilemma, 40 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 261 (2009); Foster, supra note 181.
294. See generally Bonilla Maldonado, supra note 233.
295. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law; A Map of Misreading: Toward a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. L. SOC’Y 279, 297-98 (discussing legal pluralism
and the concept of interlegality).
296. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
297. Foster [2009], supra note 293; see also Foster [2011], supra note 293
(articulating an account of local community responses to managing shared urban
resources, using Ostrom’s general approach).  Foster’s argument goes a good ways
towards establishing that inquiry into the management of urban resources has to
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understand the solutions devised by communities who rely on
informal property in their attempts to achieve the many aspects of
human flourishing that a secure dwelling situated within a simi-
larly secure community can provide.298   Occasionally we may then
be able to improve on them.  These are the benefits Bonilla Maldo-
nado argues for in criticizing legal monism in favor of description
and careful, focused prescription.299  In contrast, a one-size-fits-all
account, such as that provided by de Soto,300 is hardly sufficient,
and may often be counterproductive.301
The stakes here are large.  For “[p]roperty theory determines
how lawyers and policymakers think about urban issues and
imagine solutions.”302 A systematic failure to examine critically
the dominant individualistic approach to homeownership and
homelessness will “foreclose serious consideration of alternative
property arrangements.”303 As vague as they are, moradia, the
right to the city, the social function of property, and a certain
notion of cidadania help us to understand the concept of property
in the home.  To be sure, the Brazilian matrix within which regu-
larização occurs has its own abstractions, exotic to an American
ear not trained in them.  But these abstractions do not function
standing alone.304  As Ngai Pindell writes, “With its sometimes
chaotic, sometimes ethereal overlay of formal, legal property rules
atop the lived experiences of urban dwellers using, possessing,
building, and speculating on land, Brazil’s property system
presents the chance to see more clearly the underlying, universal
tensions in property law.”305 Similarly, in the United States, an
abstract account of the virtues and meaning of homeownership
should not ignore concreteness and context, or it will mislead,
with potentially serious consequences.  A unitary theory is likely
to miss the complexities of property ownership, especially home-
ownership.  The unexamined discourse, by its very abstractness,
masks political and social truths that would better be uncovered
account for what Bonilla Maldonado calls the extra-legal in addition to the formally
legal, and that this must be a local inquiry.
298. See Baron, supra note 19; Crawford, supra note 4; Iglesias, supra note 131;
Waldron, supra note 164.
299. Bonilla Maldonado, supra note 233.
300. See DE SOTO [2000], supra note 32.
301. See sources cited in note 33.
302. Pindell, supra note 2, at 460.
303. Id.
304. See supra the discussion of the Fordham symposium dialogue about whether
there is content to the social function of property, text at note 199.
305. Pindell, supra note 2, at 449.
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and discussed.306  Ignoring these truths may, for example, deliver
informal communities unawares to the realities of a market in
land, which, for all its benefits, is also perilous.307 Ownership may
not be the same thing as a right to moradia.
306. See, e.g., Blomley, supra note 168 (discussing how a focus on property
disguises property’s political function in creating and maintaining homelessness).
307. Compare Rose, supra note 241, at 703-05 (not viewing these perils as overly
grave), with McFarlane, supra note 27 (detailing the perils to people of color, resulting
in a systematic instability of homeownership).
